In search of yardstick competition: A spatial analysis of Italian municipality property tax setting

Journal of Urban Economics

Volumn 54, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 199-217

  Bordignon, Massimo ^a   Cerniglia, Floriana ^a   Revelli, Federico ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÀ CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TURIN   (Italy)

Author keywords

Local property tax; Spatial auto correlation; Yardstick competition

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141686944     PISSN: 00941190     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0094-1190(03)00062-7     Document Type: Article

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