Local taxes, national politics and spatial interactions in English district election results

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 281-299

  Revelli, Federico ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TURIN   (Italy)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Spatial auto correlation; Yardstick competition

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036099478     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(02)00081-2     Document Type: Article

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