Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 89, Issue 8 SPEC. ISS., 2005, Pages 1497-1517

  Fréchette, Guillaume ^a   Kagel, John H ^b   Morelli, Massimo ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Baron and Ferejohn; Gamson's Law; Legislative bargaining; Selection protocol

Indexed keywords

EID: 20944445760     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.02.009     Document Type: Article

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