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Volumn 42, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 137-155

The demand bargaining set: General characterization and application to majority games

Author keywords

Bargaining sets; Majority games; Proportional payoffs; Stable demands; Undominated coalition structures

Indexed keywords


EID: 0038066585     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00532-8     Document Type: Review
Times cited : (18)

References (21)
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.