eMediator: A next generation electronic commerce server

Computational Intelligence

Volumn 18, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 656-676

  Sandholm, Tuomas ^a  

^a Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

Author keywords

Bidding agent(s); Bidding language(s); Breach; Combinatorial auction(s); Contracting; Leveled commitment; Mobile agent(s); Proxy bidding; Safe exchange; Winner determination

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES; OPTIMIZATION; SERVERS; SOFTWARE PROTOTYPING;

COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 0036860040     PISSN: 08247935     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8640.t01-1-00209     Document Type: Article

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