Combinatorial auctions for supply chain formation

EC 2000 - Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2000, Pages 260-269

  Walsh, William E ^a   Wellman, Michael P ^a   Ygge, Fredrik ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b UPPSALA UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; COMMERCE; CONSUMER BEHAVIOR; INTERNET PROTOCOLS; SUPPLY CHAINS;

COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; DISTRIBUTED NEGOTIATIONS; GLOBAL OPTIMISATION; INPUT AND OUTPUTS; MULTIPLE LEVELS; NEGOTIATION PROTOCOL; OPTIMAL ALLOCATION; SELF-INTERESTED AGENTS; STRATEGIC BIDDING; SUPPLY CHAIN FORMATION;

GLOBAL OPTIMIZATION;

EID: 84961745822     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/352871.352900     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (19)

1. A. Andersson, M. Tenhunen, and F. Ygge. Integer programming for combinatorial auction winner determination. In Fourth International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems, pages 39-16, 2000.
2. S. Bikhchandani and J. W. Mamer. Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities. Journal of Economic Theory, 74: 385-113, 1997.
3. F. Gul and E. Stacchetti. Walrasian equilibrium without complementarities. Technical report, Princeton University and University of Michigan, 1997.
4. D. Lehmann, L. I. O'Callaghan, and Y. Shoham. Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 96-102, Denver, 1999.
5. J. K. MacKie-Mason and H. R. Varian. Generalized Vickrey auctions. Technical report, Dept. of Economics, Univ. of Michigan, July 1994.
6. R. P. McAfee and J. McMillan. Auctions and bidding. Journal ofEconomic Literature, 25: 699-738, June 1987.
7. D. C. Parkes. iBundle: An efficient ascending price bundle auction. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 148-157, 1999.
8. D. C. Parkes and L. H. Ungar. Iterative combinatorial auctions: Theory and practice. In Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 74-81, 2000.
9. D. C. Parkes and L. H. Ungar. Strategic manipulation in iterative auctions: Proxy agents and price-adjustments. In Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 82-89, 2000.
10. S. J. Rassenti, V. L. Smith, and R. L. Bulfin. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell Journal of Economics, 13: 402-117, 1982.
11. M. H. Rothkopf, A. Pekec, and R. M. Harstad. Computationally manageable combinatorial auctions. Management Science, 44: 1131-1147, 1998.
12. T. W. Sandholm and F. Ygge. On the gains and losses of speculation in equilibrium markets. In Fifteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 632-638, Nagoya, Japan, 1997.
13. W. E. Walsh and M. P. Wellman. A market protocol for decentralized task allocation. In Third International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems, pages 325-332, 1998.
14. W. E. Walsh and M. P. Wellman. Efficiency and equilibrium in task allocation economies with hierarchical dependencies. In Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 520-526, 1999.
15. W. E. Walsh and M. P. Wellman. Modeling supply chain formation in multiagent systems. In Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce II, volume 1788 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence. Springer-Verlag, 2000.
16. M. P. Wellman and J. Hu. Conjectural equilibrium in multiagent learning. Machine Learning, 33: 179-200, 1998.
17. P. R. Wurman. Market Structure and Multidimensional Auction Design for Computational Economies. PhD thesis, University of Michigan, 1999.
18. P. R. Wurman and M. P. Wellman. AkBA: A progressive, anonymous-price combinatorial auction. In Second ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2000.
19. F. Ygge. Market-Oriented Programming and its Application to Power Load Management. PhD thesis, Lund University, 1998.