Overcompensation as a partial solution to commitment and renegotiation problems: The case of ex post moral hazard

Journal of Risk and Insurance

Volumn 71, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 559-582

  Boyer, M Martin ^a  

^a HEC MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 11144231433     PISSN: 00224367     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0022-4367.2004.00104.x     Document Type: Article

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