Insurance taxation and insurance fraud

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 101-134

  Boyer, M Martin ^a  

^a HEC MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141574354     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1097-3923.00031     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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