Contracting under ex post moral hazard and non-commitment

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 1-38

  Boyer, M Martin ^a,b  

^a HEC MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

^b CIRANO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Contract theory; Ex post moral hazard; Insurance; Non commitment

Indexed keywords

EID: 1542713398     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10058-003-0086-y     Document Type: Article

References (33)

1. Arnott, R. J. (1992) Moral hazard and competitive insurance markets. In: Dionne, G. (ed.) Contributions to Insurance Economics. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston
2. Baiman, S., Demski, J. S. (1980) Economically optimal performance evaluation and control systems. Journal of Accounting Research 18s: 184-220
3. Bond, E. W., Crocker, K. J. (1991) Smoking, skydiving and knitting: The endogenous categorization of risks in insurance markets with asymmetric information. Journal of Political Economy 99: 177-200
4. Bond, E. W., Crocker, K. J. (1997) Hardball and the soft touch: The economics of optimal insurance contracts with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring. Journal of Public Economics 63: 239-254
5. Boyer, M. M. (2000) Insurance taxation and insurance fraud. Journal of Public Economic Theory 2: 101-134
6. Boyer M. M. (2003) Overcompensation as a partial solution to commitment and renegociation problems: The case of ex post moral hazard. Journal of Risk and Insurance (forthcoming)
7. Chang, C. (1990). The Dynamic Structure of Optimal Debt Contracts. Journal of Economic Theory, 52:68-86.
8. Crocker, K. J., Morgan, J. (1998) Is honesty the best policy? Curtailing insurance fraud through optimal contracts. Journal of Political Economy 106: 355-375
9. Crocker, K., Tennyson, S. (1999) Costly state falsification or verification? Theory and evidence from bodily injury liability claims. In: Dionne G., Laberge-Nadeau, C. (eds.) Automobile insurance: Road safety, new drivers, risks, insurance fraud and regulation. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston
10. Cummins, J. D., Tennyson, S. (1994) The tort system "lottery" and insurance fraud: Theory and evidence from automobile insurance. Mimeo, University of Pennsylvania
11. Dionne, G., Gagné, R. (2001) The non-optimality of deductible contracts against fraudulent claims: An empirical evidence in automobile insurance. Review of Economics and Statistics 83: 290-301
12. Dionne, G., Viala, P. (1992) Optimal design of financial contracts and moral hazard. Working paper 9219, Université de Montréal
13. Eeckhoudt, L., Gollier, C. (1995) Risk evaluation, management and sharing. Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hertfordshire
14. Gale, D., Hellwig, M. (1985) Incentive-compatible debt contracts: The one-period problem. Review of Economic Studies 52: 647-663
15. Gordon, J. P. F. (1990) Individual morality and reputation costs as deterrents to tax evasion. European Economic Review 33: 797-805
16. Graetz, M. J., Reinganum, J. F., Wilde, L. L. (1986) The tax-compliance game: Toward an interactive theory of law enforcement. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 2: 1-32
17. Harrison, G. W. (1989) Theory and misbehavior of first-price auctions. American Economic Review 79: 749-762
18. Holmstrom, B. (1979) Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics 10: 74-91
19. Hoyt, R. E. (1989) The effect of insurance fraud on the economic system. Journal of Insurance Regulation 8: 304-315
20. Kurtz, M. (1974) Experimental approach to the determination of the demand for public goods. Journal of Public Economics 3: 329-348
21. Khalil, F. (1997) Auditing without commitment. Rand Journal of Economics 28: 629-640
22. Khalil, F., Parigi, B. M. (1998) Loan size as a commitment device. International Economic Review (forthcoming)
23. Lacker, J. M., Weinberg, J. A. (1989) Optimal contracts under costly state falsification. Journal of Political Economy 97: 1345-1363
24. Mookherjee, D., Png, I. (1989) Optimal auditing, insurance and redistribution. Quarterly Journal of Economics 104: 205-228
25. Persons, J. C. (1997) Liars never prosper? How management misrepresentation reduces monitoring costs. Journal of Financial Intermediation 6: 269-306
26. Picard, P. (1996) Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue. Journal of Public Economics 63: 27-56
27. Rasmussen, E. (1989) Games and information: An introduction to game theory. Blackwell, New York
28. Ross, S. (1973) The economic theory of agency: The insurer's problem. American Economic Review 63: 134-139
29. Sanchez, I., Sobel, J. (1993) Hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies. Journal of Public Economics 50: 345-369
30. Scotchmer, S. (1987) Audit classes and tax enforcement policy. American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings 77: 229-233
31. Spence, A. M., Zeckhauser, R. (1971) Insurance, information and individual action. American Economic Review 61: 380-387
32. Townsend, R. M. (1979) Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification. Journal of Economic Theory 21: 265-293
33. Winter, R. A. (1992) Moral hazard and insurance contracts. In: Dionne, G. (ed.) Contributions to Insurance Economics. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston