Liars Never Prosper? How Management Misrepresentation Reduces Monitoring Costs

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Volumn 6, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 269-306

  Persons, John C ^a  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039469831     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jfin.1997.0223     Document Type: Article

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