Caring about Sunk Costs: A Behavioral Solution to Holdup Problems with Small Stakes

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 106-118

  Carmichael, Lorne ^a   Bentley MacLeod, W ^b  

^a QUEEN S UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0345547436     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/19.1.106     Document Type: Review

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