Central banker contracts, incomplete information, and monetary policy surprises: In search of a selfish central banker?

Public Choice

Volumn 116, Issue 3-4, 2003, Pages 271-295

  Chortareas, Georgios E ^a   Miller, Stephen M ^b  

^a BANK OF ENGLAND   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042305035     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1024883503192     Document Type: Review

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