Inflation contracts and inflation targets under uncertainty: Why we might need conservative central bankers

Economica

Volumn 66, Issue 262, 1999, Pages 241-254

  Muscatelli, V Anton ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BANKING; INFLATION; MONETARY POLICY; UNCERTAINTY ROLE;

EID: 0032765986     PISSN: 00130427     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0335.00167     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. AL-NOWAIHI, A. and LEVINE, P. (1996). Independent but accountable: Walsh contracts and the credibility problem. Mimeo, University of Surrey.
2. ALMEIDA, A. and GOODHART, C. A. E. (1996). Does the adoption of inflation targets affect central bank behaviour? Mimeo, FMG, London School of Economics.
3. BALLS, E. (1998). Open macroeconomics in an open economy, Fourth Royal Bank of Scotland/ Scottish Economic Society Lecture. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 45, 113-32.
4. BARRO, R. and GORDON, D. B. (1983). Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 101-21.
5. BEETSMA, R. and JENSEN, H. (1996). Inflation targets and contracts with uncertain central banker preferences. Mimeo, University of Copenhagen; forthcoming in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
6. BRIAULT, C. B., HALDANE, A. G. and KING, M. (1996). Independence and Accountability. Bank of England Working Paper, no. 49.
7. CANZONERI, M. B. (1985). Monetary policy games and the role of private information. American Economic Review, 75, 1056-70.
8. CROSS, R., DARBY, J. and IRELAND, J. (1997). Uncertainties Surrounding Natural Rate Estimates in the G7. Discussion Paper no. 9712, University of Glasgow.
9. CUKIERMAN, A. (1992). Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and Independence: Theory and Evidence. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
10. FREEMAN, R. T. and WILLIS, J. L. (1995). Targeting Inflation in the 1990s: Recent Challenges. International Finance Discussion Paper no. 525, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, September.
11. FREGERT, K. and JONUNG, L. (1996). Inflation and switches between specie and paper standards in Sweden: a public finance interpretation. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 43, 444-67.
12. FRIEDMAN, M. (1968). The role of monetary policy. American Economic Review, 58, 1-17.
13. HERRENDORF, B. (1996). Inflation targeting as a substitute for precommitment. Mimeo, University of Warwick.
14. _, and LOCKWOOD, B. (1997). Rogoff's conservative central banker restored. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 29, 476-95.
15. LEIDERMAN, L. and SVENSSON, L. E. O. (eds.) (1995). Inflation Targets. London: CEPR.
16. LOHMANN, S. F (1992). Optimal commitment in monetary policy: credibility versus flexibility. American Economic Review, 82, 273-86.
17. LOSSANI, M., NATALE, P. G. and TIRELLI, P. (1998). Incomplete information in monetary policy games: rules rather than a conservative central banker. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 45, 33-47.
18. MCCALLUM, B. T. (1996). Crucial Issues Concerning Central Bank Independence. NBER Working Paper no. 5597.
19. MUSCATELLI, V. A. (1995). Delegation versus Optimal Inflation Contracts: Do We Really Need Conservative Central Bankers? University of Glasgow Discussion Paper no. 9511 (revised).
20. _ (1998). Optimal inflation contracts and inflation targets with uncertain preferences: accountability through independence. Economic Journal, 108, 529-42.
21. NOLAN, C. and SCHALING, E. (1996). Monetary policy uncertainty and central bank accountability. Mimeo, Monetary Assessment and Strategy Divison, Bank of England.
22. PERSSON, T. and TABELLINI, G. (1990). Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility, and Politics. New York: Harwood Academic.
23. _ and _ (1993). Designing Institutions for Monetary Stability. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, no. 39.
24. POSEN, A. S. (1995). Declaration are not enough: financial sector sources of central bank independence. NBER Macroeconomics Annual, pp. 253-74.
25. ROGOFF, K. (1985). The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 1169-89.
26. STAIGER, D., STOCK, J. H. and WATSON, M. W. (1997). The NAIRU, unemployment and monetary policy. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11, 33-50.
27. SVENSSON, L. E. O. (1997). Optimal inflation targets, 'conservative' central banks, and linear inflation contracts. American Economic Review, 87, 98-114.
28. WALLER, C. (1992). A bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank. Journal of Monetary Economics, 29, 411-28.
29. WALSH, C. (1995). Optimal contracts for central bankers. American Economic Review, 85, 150-67.
30. _ (1998). Announcements, inflation targeting and central bank incentives. Economica, forthcoming.