Elections with privately informed parties and voters

Public Choice

Volumn 108, Issue 1-2, 2001, Pages 147-167

  Martinelli, César ^a  

^a INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO AUTÓNOMO DE MÉXICO   (Mexico)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035615732     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1017514106456     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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