Monetary policy, delegation and polarisation

Economic Journal

Volumn 109, Issue 455, 1999, Pages 164-178

  Schultz, Christian ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008560028     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00425     Document Type: Article

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