Polarization and Inefficient Policies

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 63, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 331-344

  Schultz, Christian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008562267     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2297855     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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3. BANKS, J. (1990a), "Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105, 445-464.
4. BANKS, J. (1990b), "A Model of Electoral Competition with Incomplete Information", Journal of Economic Theory, 50, 309-325.
5. CHO, I-K., and KREPS, D. (1987), "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 179-221.
6. DOWNS, A. (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row).
7. HARRINGTON, J. E. Jr. (1993), "Economic Policy, Economic Performance, and Elections", American Economic Review, 83, 27-42.
8. GILLIGAN, T. and KREHBIEL, K. (1989), "Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogenous Committee", American Journal of Political Science, 33, 450-490.
9. LOHMANN, S. (1993), "A Signalling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action", American Political Science Review, 87, 319-333.
10. LOHMANN, S. (1994), "Information Aggregation thorough Costly Political Action", American Economic Review, 84, 518-530.
11. ROEMER, J. (1991), "A Theory of Class Politics in an Electoral Democracy" (Dept. of Economics, University of California, Davis, Working Paper 384).
12. ROEMER, J. (1994), "The Strategic Role of Party Ideology when Voters are Uncertain About How the Economy Works", American Political Science Review, 88, 327-335.