A market based evaluation of the election versus appointment of regulatory commissioners

Public Choice

Volumn 92, Issue 3-4, 1997, Pages 337-351

  Fields, Joseph A ^a   Klein, Linda S ^a   Sfiridis, James M ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

^b CENTRAL CONNECTICUT STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031522244     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1017938426780     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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