Iterated prisoner’s dilemma and evolutionary game theory

Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma, The: 20 Years On

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 23-62

  Chong, Siang Yew ^a   Humble, Jan ^b   Kendall, Graham ^b   Li, Jiawei ^b,c   Yao, Xin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^c HARBIN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (China)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85115908050     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1142/9789812770684_0002     Document Type: Chapter

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