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Games and Economic Behavior
Volumn 19, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 133-143
Common Belief of Rationality in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
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EID: 0039270443     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0549     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (14)
References (15)
  • 1
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    • (1987) Econometrica , vol.55 , pp. 1-18
    • Aumann, R.J.1
  • 2
    • 0002548374 scopus 로고
    • Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality
    • Aumann R. J. Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality. Games Econ. Behav. 8:1995;6-19.
    • (1995) Games Econ. Behav. , vol.8 , pp. 6-19
    • Aumann, R.J.1
  • 5
    • 33947676620 scopus 로고
    • Nash Equilibria of Finitely Repeated Games
    • Benoit J.-P., Krishna V. Nash Equilibria of Finitely Repeated Games. Int J. Game Theory. 16:1987;197-204.
    • (1987) Int J. Game Theory , vol.16 , pp. 197-204
    • Benoit, J.-P.1    Krishna, V.2
  • 6
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    • Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
    • Bernheim B. D. Rationalizable Strategic Behavior. Econometrica. 52:1984;1007-1028.
    • (1984) Econometrica , vol.52 , pp. 1007-1028
    • Bernheim, B.D.1
  • 8
    • 0000380658 scopus 로고
    • Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
    • Brandenburger A., Dekel E. Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria. Econometrica. 55:1987;1391-1402.
    • (1987) Econometrica , vol.55 , pp. 1391-1402
    • Brandenburger, A.1    Dekel, E.2
  • 9
    • 38249016662 scopus 로고
    • Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty
    • Dekel E., Fudenberg D. Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty. J. Econ. Theory. 52:1990;243-267.
    • (1990) J. Econ. Theory , vol.52 , pp. 243-267
    • Dekel, E.1    Fudenberg, D.2
  • 10
    • 0000725056 scopus 로고
    • Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players
    • Harsanyi J. Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players. Manage. Sci. 8:1967-1968.
    • (1967) Manage. Sci. , vol.8
    • Harsanyi, J.1
  • 11
    • 0003161771 scopus 로고
    • Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs: A New Rationale for Mixed Strategy Equilibrium Points
    • Harsanyi J. Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs: A New Rationale for Mixed Strategy Equilibrium Points. Int. J. Game Theory. 2:1973;1-23.
    • (1973) Int. J. Game Theory , vol.2 , pp. 1-23
    • Harsanyi, J.1
  • 12
    • 0000319051 scopus 로고
    • Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
    • Pearce D. G. Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection. Econometrica. 52:1984;1029-1050.
    • (1984) Econometrica , vol.52 , pp. 1029-1050
    • Pearce, D.G.1
  • 13
    • 0001782271 scopus 로고
    • Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing and the Chain-Store Paradox
    • Rosenthal R. W. Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing and the Chain-Store Paradox. J. Econ. Theory. 25:1981;92-100.
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    • Rosenthal, R.W.1
  • 14
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    • Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information
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    • (1993) J. Econ. Theory , vol.59 , pp. 257-274
    • Reny, P.J.1
  • 15
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    • The Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games
    • Tan T., Werlang S. The Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games. J. Econ. Theory. 45:1988;370-391.
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.