The ecology of cooperation

Theory and Decision

Volumn 50, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 101-118

  Hoffmann, Robert ^a  

^a NOTTINGHAM UNIVERSITY BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Coevolution; Evolutionary stability; Genetic algorithms; Repeated prisoner's dilemma; Strategy ecology

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041332894     PISSN: 00405833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1010353814597     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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