Framing

Logic, Argumentation and Reasoning

Volumn 10, Issue , 2016, Pages 189-215

  Grüne Yanoff, Till ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI   (Finland)

Author keywords

Behavioural economics; Behavioural policy; Boost; Bounded rationality; Descriptive decision theory; Framing; Lotteries; Mechanisms; Normative decision theory; Nudge; Preferences; Uncertainty

Indexed keywords

EID: 85048765212     PISSN: 22149120     EISSN: 22149139     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-30549-3_8     Document Type: Chapter

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