Framing as path dependence

Economics and Philosophy

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 253-277

  Gold, Natalie ^a   List, Christian ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 10844219622     PISSN: 02662671     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0266267104000203     Document Type: Review

References (24)

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