The consistency and ecological rationality approaches to normative bounded rationality

Journal of Economic Methodology

Volumn 21, Issue 4, 2014, Pages 375-395

  Berg, Nathan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OTAGO   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

intransitivity; logical inconsistency; methodological monism; methodological pluralism; normative behavioral economics

Indexed keywords

EID: 84919705805     PISSN: 1350178X     EISSN: 14699427     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/1350178X.2014.969910     Document Type: Article

References (56)

1. Anand, P. (1993). The philosophy of intransitive preference. The Economic Journal, 103, 337–346.
2. Backhouse, R. E. (1998). If mathematics is informal, then perhaps we should accept that economics must be informal too. The Economic Journal, 108, 1848–1858.
3. Baucells, M., Carrascom, J. A., & Hogarth, R. M. (2008). Cumulative dominance and heuristic performance in binary multi-attribute choice. Operations Research, 56, 1289–1304.
4. Berg, N. (2003). Normative behavioral economics. Journal of Socio-Economics, 32, 411–427.
5. Berg, N. (2010). Behavioral economics. In R. C.Free (Ed.), 21st century economics: A reference handbook (Vol. 2, pp. 861–872). Los Angeles, CA: Sage.
6. Berg, N. (2014). Success from satisficing and imitation: Entrepreneurs' location choice and implications of heuristics for local economic development. Journal of Business Research, 67, 1700–1709.
7. Berg, N. (2015). Gerd Gigerenzer. In M.Altman (Ed.), Real world decision making: An encyclopedia of behavioral economics. Santa Barbara: Praeger, ABC-CLIO.
8. Berg, N., Abramczuk, K., & Hoffrage, U. (2013). Schelling's neighborhood segregation model with FACE-recognition. In R.Hertwig, U.Hoffrage, & The ABC Research Group (Eds.), Simple heuristics in a social world (pp. 225–257). New York: Oxford University Press.
9. Berg, N., Biele, G., & Gigerenzer, G. (2013). Does consistency predict accuracy of beliefs?: Economists surveyed about PSA. Working Paper, University of Otago.
10. Berg, N., Eckel, C., & Johnson, C. (2014). Inconsistency pays?: Time-inconsistent subjects and EU violators earn more. Working Paper, University of Otago.
11. Berg, N., & Gigerenzer, G. (2006). Peacemaking among inconsistent rationalities. In C.Engel & L.Daston (Eds.), Is there value in inconsistency? (pp. 421–433). Baden-Baden: Nomos.
12. Berg, N., & Gigerenzer, G. (2007). Psychology implies paternalism?: Bounded rationality may reduce the rationale to regulate risk-taking. Social Choice and Welfare, 28, 337–359.
13. Berg, N., & Gigerenzer, G. (2010). As-if behavioral economics: Neoclassical economics in disguise?History of Economic Ideas, 18, 133–166.
14. Berg, N., & Hoffrage, U. (2008). Rational ignoring with unbounded cognitive capacity. Journal of Economic Psychology, 29, 792–809.
15. Berg, N., & Hoffrage, U. (2010). Compressed environments: Unbounded optimizers should sometimes ignore information. Minds and Machines, 20, 259–275.
16. Berg, N., Hoffrage, U., & Abramczuk, K. (2010). Fast acceptance by common experience: FACE-recognition in Schelling's model of neighborhood segregation. Judgment and Decision Making, 5, 391–410.
17. Binder, M. (2010). Elements of an evolutionary theory of welfare: Assessing welfare when preferences change. Hoboken, NJ: Taylor and Francis.
18. Binder, M. (2013). Should evolutionary economists embrace libertarian paternalism?Journal of Evolutionary Economics. Advance online publication.
19. Bookstaber, R., & Langsam, J. (1985). On the optimality of coarse behavior rules. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 116, 161–193.
20. Bruni, L., & Porta, P. L. (Eds.). (2007). Handbook on the economics of happiness. Gloucestershire: Edward Elgar.
21. Caplan, B. (2000). Rational irrationality: A framework for the neoclassical-behavioral debate. Eastern Economic Journal, 26, 191–211.
22. Gigerenzer, G. (1991). From tools to theories: A heuristic of discovery in cognitive psychology. Psychological Review, 98, 254–267.
23. Gigerenzer, G. (2004). Fast and frugal heuristics: The tools of bounded rationality. In D. J.Koehler & N.Harvey (Eds.), Blackwell handbook of judgment and decision making (pp. 62–88). Oxford: Blackwell.
24. Gigerenzer, G., & Selten, R. (Eds.). (2001). Rethinking rationality. Bounded rationality: The adaptive toolbox (pp. 1–12). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
25. Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P. M., & The ABC Research Group. (1999). Simple heuristics that make us smart. New York: Oxford University Press.
26. Gilboa, I. (2014). Rationality and the Bayesian paradigm: An integrative note. Working Paper. Retrieved from http://www.econbiz.de/Record/rationality-and-the-bayesian-paradigm-an-integrative-note-gilboa-itzhak/10010241309.
27. Gilboa, I., Postlewaite, A., & Schmeidler, D. (2009). Is it always rational to satisfy Savage's axioms?Economics and Philosophy, 25, 285–296.
28. Grüne-Yanoff, T. (2004). The problems of testing preference axioms with revealed preference theory. Analyse & Kritik, 26, 382–397.
29. Grüne-Yanoff, T. (2013). Appraising models non-representationally. Philosophy of Science, 80, 850–861.
30. Güth, W., & Kliemt, H. (2001). From full to bounded rationality: The limits of unlimited rationality. Discussion papers, interdisciplinary research project 373: Quantification and simulation of economic processes.
31. Hertwig, R., Hoffrage, U., & The ABC Research Group. (2013). Simple heuristics in a social world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
32. Jolls, C., & Sunstein, C. R. (2006). Debiasing through law. Journal of Legal Studies, 35, 199–241.
33. Jolls, C., Sunstein, C. R., & Thaler, R. H. (1998). A behavioral approach to law and economics. Stanford Law Review, 50, 1471–1541.
34. Kameda, T., Tsukasaki, T., Hastie, R., & Berg, N. (2011). Democracy under uncertainty: The wisdom of crowds and the free-rider problem in group decision making. Psychological Review, 118, 76–96.
35. Karabell, Z. (2014). (Mis)leading indicators: Why our economic numbers distort reality. Foreign Affairs, March/April. Retrieved from http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140749/zachary-karabell/misleading-indicators.
36. Lipsey, R. G., & Lancaster, K. (1956–1957). The general theory of second best. Review of Economic Studies, 24, 11–32.
37. Manzini, P., & Mariotti, M. (2007). Sequentially rationalizable choice. The American Economic Review, 97, 1824–1839.
38. Manzini, P., & Mariotti, M. (2010). Revealed preferences and boundedly rational choice procedures: An experiment. Working Paper, University College London.
39. Manzini, P., & Mariotti, M. (2012). Categorize the choose: Boundedly rational choice and welfare. Journal of the European Economic Association, 10, 1141–1165.
40. Phelps, E. S., & Pollak, R. A. (1968). On second-best national saving and game-equilibrium growth. Review of Economic Studies, 35, 185–199.
41. Rubinstein, A. (2001). A theorist's view of experiments. European Economic Review, 45, 615–628.
42. Rubinstein, A. (2003). ‘Economics and psychology’? The case of hyperbolic discounting. International Economic Review, 44, 1207–1216.
43. Schubert, C. (2012). Is novelty always a good thing?: Towards an evolutionary welfare economics. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 22, 585–619.
44. Sen, A. K. (1985). Well-being, agency and freedom: The Dewey lectures 1984. The Journal of Philosophy, 82, 169–221.
45. Sen, A. K. (1991). Welfare, preference and freedom. Journal of Econometrics, 50, 15–29.
46. Simon, H. A. (1978). Rationality as process and as product of thought. The American Economic Review, 68, 1–16.
47. Smith, V. L. (2003). Constructivist and ecological rationality in economics. American Economic Review, 93, 465–508.
48. Sugden, R. (2004). The opportunity criterion: Consumer sovereignty without the assumption of coherent preferences. The American Economic Review, 94, 1014–1033.
49. Sugden, R. (2008). Why incoherent preferences do not justify paternalism. Constitutional Political Economy, 19, 226–248.
50. Thaler, R. H. (1991). Quasi rational economics. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
51. The ABC Research Group, Todd, P. M., & Gigerernzer, G. (2012). Ecological rationality: Intelligence in the world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
52. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1986). Rational choice and the framing of decisions. Journal of Business, 59, S251–S278.
53. Wegner, G. (2009). Substantive versus procedural liberalism: Exploring a dilemma of contemporary liberal thought. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 165, 535–557.
54. Weizsäcker, C. C. (2005). The welfare economics of adaptive preferences. Preprint, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, No. 05/11.
55. Witt, U. (2003). Economic policy making in evolutionary perspective. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 13, 77–94.
56. Yee, M., Dahan, E., Hauser, J. R., & Orlin, J. (2007). Greedoid-based noncompensatory inference. Marketing Science, 26, 532–549.