Value Uncertainty

Logic, Argumentation and Reasoning

Volumn 10, Issue , 2016, Pages 105-133

  Möller, Niklas ^a  

^a ROYAL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Argumentation; Contextualization; Fact value distinction; Normative theorizing; Reflective equilibrium; Value uncertainty

Indexed keywords

EID: 85061419248     PISSN: 22149120     EISSN: 22149139     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-30549-3_5     Document Type: Chapter

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