Consciousness as a scientific concept: A philosophy of science perspective

Consciousness as a Scientific Concept: A Philosophy of Science Perspective

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 1-182

  Irvine, Elizabeth ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TÜBINGEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Consciousness science; Contents of consciousness; Epistemology consciousness; Phenomenal consciousness; Scientific concept consciousness; Scientific eliminativism consciousness; Scientific viability hard problem; Scientific viability soft problem; Sensory memory

Indexed keywords

EID: 85042844037     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-5173-6     Document Type: Book

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