Mechanisms and natural kinds

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 22, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 575-594

  Craver, Carl F ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Mechanism; Natural Kinds; Taxonomy

Indexed keywords

EID: 74949099103     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: 1465394X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09515080903238930     Document Type: Article

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