Dead Money: Inheritance Law and the Longevity of Family Firms

Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice

Volumn 38, Issue 6, 2014, Pages 1261-1283

  Carney, Michael ^a   Gedajlovic, Eric ^b   Strike, Vanessa M ^c,d  

^a Canada   (Canada)

^b SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^d ERASMUS UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85027957905     PISSN: 10422587     EISSN: 15406520     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/etap.12123     Document Type: Article

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