One size does not fit all: Entrepreneurial families' reliance on family offices

European Management Journal

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 37-45

  Wessel, Stephan ^a   Decker, Carolin ^a   Lange, Knut S G ^b   Hack, Andreas ^c  

^a WHU OTTO BEISHEIM SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SURREY   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BERN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Control mechanisms; Family offices; Goals; Management; Ownership; Wealth management

Indexed keywords

EID: 84892520579     PISSN: 02632373     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.emj.2013.08.003     Document Type: Article

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