Beyond subjective and objective in statistics

Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A: Statistics in Society

Volumn 180, Issue 4, 2017, Pages 967-1033

  Gelman, Andrew ^a   Hennig, Christian ^b  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bayesian; Frequentist; Good practice; Philosophy of statistics; Virtues

Indexed keywords

EID: 85026482994     PISSN: 09641998     EISSN: 1467985X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/rssa.12276     Document Type: Article

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