How to Undermine Underdetermination?

Foundations of Science

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2015, Pages 107-127

  Bandyopadhyay, Prasanta S ^a   Bennett, John G ^b   Higgs, Megan D ^a  

^a MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Argument from reliability; Model selection issues; Pragmatic Bayesianism; Problems for subjective Bayesianism; Three senses of subjectivism in Bayesianism

Indexed keywords

BAYESIAN; BAYESIANISM; INDUCTIVE METHOD; MODEL SELECTION ISSUE; SCIENTIFIC THEORIES;

SOCIAL SCIENCES;

EID: 84929522735     PISSN: 12331821     EISSN: 15728471     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10699-014-9353-3     Document Type: Article

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