Pay for performance in the inpatient sector: A review of 34 P4P programs in 14 OECD countries

Health Policy

Volumn 120, Issue 10, 2016, Pages 1125-1140

  Milstein, Ricarda ^a   Schreyoegg, Jonas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Hospital; Pay for performance; Provider payment; Quality of care

Indexed keywords

AWARENESS; CASE REPORT; DATA BASE; EXPECTATION; HOSPITAL PATIENT; HUMAN; INFORMATION PROCESSING; ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT; REWARD; ECONOMICS; HOSPITAL; ITALY; ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT; REIMBURSEMENT; STANDARDS; TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT; TREATMENT OUTCOME;

HOSPITALS; HUMANS; INPATIENTS; ITALY; ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT; OUTCOME AND PROCESS ASSESSMENT (HEALTH CARE); QUALITY IMPROVEMENT; REIMBURSEMENT, INCENTIVE;

EID: 84995452439     PISSN: 01688510     EISSN: 18726054     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2016.08.009     Document Type: Review

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