Incentives and targets in hospital care: Evidence from a natural experiment

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 94, Issue 3-4, 2010, Pages 318-335

  Propper, Carol ^a,b   Sutton, Matt ^c,d   Whitnall, Carolyn ^a   Windmeijer, Frank ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL   (United Kingdom)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

^d UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Health care; Incentives; Targets; Waiting times

Indexed keywords

EID: 76949085685     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.01.002     Document Type: Article

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