Pay-for-performance: Toxic to quality insights from behavioral economics

International Journal of Health Services

Volumn 44, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 203-214

  Himmelstein, David U ^a,b   Ariely, Dan ^c   Woolhandler, Steffie ^a  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^b HIGHLAND HOSPITAL   (United States)

^c DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALTRUISM; ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; HEALTH CARE; PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT; RESEARCH WORK; TOXICITY;

ALTRUISM; ARTICLE; BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS; COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; ECONOMICS; HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH; HUMAN; MEDICARE; MOTIVATION; PHYSICIAN ATTITUDE; PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT; REIMBURSEMENT; TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT; UNITED STATES;

ALTRUISM; COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS; ECONOMICS, BEHAVIORAL; HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH; HUMANS; MEDICARE; MOTIVATION; PHYSICIAN'S ROLE; QUALITY IMPROVEMENT; REIMBURSEMENT, INCENTIVE; UNITED STATES;

EID: 85047687127     PISSN: 00207314     EISSN: 15414469     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2190/hs.44.2.a     Document Type: Article

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