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Volumn 12, Issue 2, 2016, Pages 447-475

What Makes Law to Change Behavior? An Experimental Study

Author keywords

conditional cooperation; incentives; public goods; sanctions

Indexed keywords


EID: 84977483430     PISSN: None     EISSN: 15555879     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1515/rle-2015-0045     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (7)

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