How laws affect behavior: Obligations, incentives and cooperative behavior

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 38, Issue , 2014, Pages 48-57

  Galbiati, Roberto ^a   Vertova, Pietro ^b  

^a SCIENCES PO   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BERGAMO   (Italy)

Author keywords

Beliefs; Formal rules; Human behavior; Incentives; Laws; Obligations; Preferences; Public good game

Indexed keywords

EID: 84897406515     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2014.03.001     Document Type: Article

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