Fighting income tax evasion with positive rewards

Public Finance Review

Volumn 39, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 124-149

  Bazart, Cécile ^a   Pickhardt, Michael ^b  

^a UNIV MONTPELLIER   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MÜNSTER   (Germany)

Author keywords

lottery; public goods; rewards; tax compliance; tax evasion

Indexed keywords

EID: 78650714001     PISSN: 10911421     EISSN: 15527530     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1091142110381639     Document Type: Article

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