Moral suasion: An alternative tax policy strategy? Evidence from a controlled field experiment in Switzerland

Economics of Governance

Volumn 5, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 235-253

  Torgler, Benno ^a,b,c  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BASEL   (Switzerland)

^c CREMA CENTER FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Field experiment; Morale suasion; Tax compliance

Indexed keywords

EID: 8744303884     PISSN: 14356104     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10101-004-0077-7     Document Type: Article

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