Formal Epistemology and the New Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning

Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Volumn 5, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 199-221

  Pfeifer, Niki ^a   Douven, Igor ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84900839433     PISSN: 18785158     EISSN: 18785166     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s13164-013-0165-0     Document Type: Article

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