New normative standards of conditional reasoning and the dual-source model

Frontiers in Psychology

Volumn 5, Issue APR, 2014, Pages

  Singmann, Henrik ^a   Klauer, Karl Christoph ^a   Over, David ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG   (Germany)

^b DURHAM UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Coherence; Conditional reasoning; Dual source model; Mixed models; New paradigm psychology of reasoning; p validity; Probabilistic reasoning; Rationality

Indexed keywords

EID: 84899684344     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16641078     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00316     Document Type: Article

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