Can there be reasoning with degrees of belief?

Synthese

Volumn 190, Issue 16, 2013, Pages 3535-3551

  Staffel, Julia ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Degrees of belief; Harman; Probability; Reasoning

Indexed keywords

EID: 84888119470     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-012-0209-5     Document Type: Article

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