Secure combinatorial auctions by dynamic programming with polynomial secret sharing

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 2357, Issue , 2003, Pages 44-56

  Suzuki, Koutarou ^a   Yokoo, Makoto ^b  

^a NTT CORPORATION   (Japan)

^b NTT Communication Science Laboratories   (Japan)

Author keywords

Combinatorial auction; Dynamic programming; Secret sharing; Spectrum auction

Indexed keywords

CHROMIUM COMPOUNDS; COMBINATORIAL OPTIMIZATION; COMMERCE; CRYPTOGRAPHY;

BIDDING PRICES; COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; COMBINATORIAL OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS; MULTIPLE ITEMS; OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS; SECRET SHARING; SPECTRUM AUCTIONS;

DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING;

EID: 84957038963     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-36504-4_4     Document Type: Conference Paper

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