Sealed bid multi-object auctions with necessary bundles and its application to spectrum auctions

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 2132, Issue , 2001, Pages 78-92

  Matsui, Tomomi ^a   Watanabe, Takahiro ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO   (Japan)

^b IWATE PREFECTURAL UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMBINATORIAL OPTIMIZATION; DATA PRIVACY; INTELLIGENT AGENTS; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; NETWORK SECURITY; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

ASSIGNMENT PROBLEMS; COMPLETE INFORMATION; EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS; ITS APPLICATIONS; LINEAR INEQUALITY SYSTEMS; MULTIPLE OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS; REVENUE MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM; SPECTRUM AUCTIONS;

COMMERCE;

EID: 0010276961     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-44637-0_6     Document Type: Conference Paper

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