Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design

ACM International Conference Proceeding Series

Volumn , Issue , 1999, Pages 129-139

  Naor, Moni ^a   Pinkas, Benny ^a   Sumner, Reuban ^a  

^a WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ACTIVE PARTS; AUCTIONS AND MECHANISM DESIGNS; DECISION PROCEDURE; MECHANISM DESIGN; POSTERIORI; PRIVACY PRESERVING; TRUSTED PARTY;

COMMUNICATION; COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; MACHINE DESIGN;

NETWORK ARCHITECTURE;

EID: 84883898504     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/336992.337028     Document Type: Conference Paper

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