Secure multi-agent dynamic programming based on homomorphic encryption and its application to combinatorial auctions

Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents

Volumn , Issue 2, 2002, Pages 112-119

  Yokoo, Makoto ^a   Suzuki, Koutarou ^a  

^a NTT Communication Science Laboratories   (Japan)

Author keywords

Auction; Dynamic Programming; Public Key Encryption

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY; SECURITY OF DATA;

COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 0036367593     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/544767.544770     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (25)

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