Expert intuition

Rational Intuition: Philosophical Roots, Scientific Investigations

Volumn , Issue , 2014, Pages 213-238

  Cokely, Edward T ^a   Feltz, Adam ^a  

^a MICHIGAN TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84953790364     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139136419.013     Document Type: Chapter

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