Gender and Philosophical Intuition

Experimental Philosophy

Volumn 2, Issue , 2014, Pages

  Buckwalter, Wesley ^b   Stich, Stephen ^a  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

Academic philosophy; Christina starmans; David pizarro; Female underrepresentation; Gender differences; Gender gap; Geoffrey holtzman; Gettier style; Intuition; Ori friedman

Indexed keywords

EID: 84938687164     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199927418.003.0013     Document Type: Chapter

References (75)

1. Bealer, G. (1998). Intuition and the autonomy of philosophy. In M. DePaul and W. Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 201-239.
2. Beebe, J. and Buckwalter, W. (2010). The epistemic side-effect effect. Mind and Language, 25:474-498.
3. Beebe, J. and Jensen, M. (forthcoming). Surprising connections between knowledge and action: The robustness of the epistemic side-effect effect. Philosophical Psychology.
4. Beebee, H. and Saul, J. (2011). Women in Philosophy in the UK: A Report.
5. Bednar, J. and Miikkulainen, R. (2003). Learning innate face preferences. Neural Computation, 15:1525-1557.
6. Buckwalter, W. (unpublished manuscript, a). Gender and epistemic intuition. City University of New York, Graduate Center.
7. Buckwalter, W. (unpublished manuscript, b). Solving the puzzle of causation by absence:Experiments in metaphysics. City University of New York, Graduate Center.
8. Brueckner, T. (2008). Brains in a Vat. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). >.
9. Cappelen, H. (forthcoming). Philosophy without Intuitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
10. Croson, R. and Gneezy, U. (2009). Gender differences in preferences. Journal of Economic Literature, 47:448-474.
11. Cummins, R. (1998). Reflections on reflective equilibrium. In M. DePaul and W. Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 113-127.
12. Deutsch, M. (2010). Intuitions, counter-examples and experimental philosophy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1:447-460.
13. Devitt, M. (2006). Intuitions. In V. Gomez Pin, J. Galparaso and G. Arrizabalaga (eds.), Ontology Studies Cuadernos de Ontologia: Proceedings of VI International Ontology Congress, 169-176.
14. Devitt, M. (2009). On determining what there isn't. In D. Murphy and M. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Oxford: Blackwell, 46-61.
15. Dweck, C. and Gilliard, D. (1975). Expectancy statements as determinants of reactions to failure: Sex differences in persistence and expectancy change. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32:1077-1084.
16. Dweck, C. and Bush, E. (1976). Sex differences in learned helplessness: I. Differential debilitation with peer and adult evaluators. Developmental Psychology, 12:147-156.
17. Dweck, C. (2000). Self-Theories: Their Role in Motivation, Personality, and Development. New York: Psychology Press.
18. Dweck, C. (2006). Is math a gift? Beliefs that put females at risk. In S. Ceci and W. Williams, (eds.), Why Aren't More Women in Science? Top Researchers Debate the Evidence. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Also available at:. Page references in the text are to the website version.
19. Dweck, C. (2008). Mindset: The New Psychology of Success. New York: Ballantine Books.
20. Eagly, A. (1995). The science and politics of comparing women and men. American Psychologist, 50:145-158.
21. Eckel, C. and Grossman, P. (1998). Are women less selfish than men? Evidence from dictator experiments. Economic Journal, 108:726-735.
22. Eckel, C. and Grossman, P. (2008a). The difference in the economic decisions of men and women: Experimental evidence. In C. Plott and V. Smith (eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics Results. Amsterdam: North-Holland/Elsevier, 509-519.
23. Eckel, C. and Grossman, P. (2008b). Sex and risk: Experimental evidence. In C. Plott and V. Smith (eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics Results. Amsterdam: North-Holland/Elsevier, 1061-1073.
24. Feltz, A., Cokely, E. and Nadelhoffer, T. (2009). Natural compatibilism versus natural incompatibilism: Back to the drawing board. Mind and Language, 24:1-23.
25. Gendler, T. (2007). Philosophical thought experiments, intuitions, and cognitive equilibrium. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 31:68-89.
26. Gettier, E. L. (1963). Is justified true belief knowledge? Analysis 23:121-123.
27. Goldman, A. (2007). Philosophical intuitions: their target, their source, and their epistemic status. Grazer Philosophiche Studien, 74:1-26.
28. Grant, H. and Dweck, C. (2003). Clarifying achievement goals and their impact. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85:541-553.
29. Halpern, D. (2011). Sex Differences in Cognitive Abilities, 4th ed. Florence, KY:Psychology Press, Taylor & Francis.
30. Haslanger, S. (2008). Changing the ideology and culture of philosophy: Not by reason (alone). Hypatia, 23:210-223.
31. Henrich, J., Heine, S. and Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33:61-83.
32. Hintikka, J. (1999). The emperor's new intuitions. Journal of Philosophy, 96:127-147.
33. Hitchcock, C. & Knobe, J. (2009). Cause and norm. Journal of Philosophy, 106:587-612.
34. Holtzman, G. (2013). Do personality effects mean philosophy is intrinsically subjective? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 20:27-42.
35. Holtzman, G. (under review, a). Personal is universal: Why women's judgments of moral agency are more reliable than men's.
36. Holtzman, G. (under review, b). Neuroessentialism, neuropluralism, and normative gender differences in the judgment of violent psychopaths.
37. Hyde, J. S. (2005). The gender similarities hypothesis. American Psychologist, 60:581-592.
38. Ichikawa, J. (2008). Imagination and Epistemology, Ph.D. dissertation, submitted to the Graduate School of Rutgers University, Chapter 5.
39. Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly, 32:127-136.
40. Jackson, F. (1986). What Mary didn't know. Journal of Philosophy, 83:291-295.
41. Jackson, F. (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
42. Knobe, J. (2003). Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language. Analysis, 63:190-193.
43. Knobe, J. (2010). Person as scientist, person as moralist. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33:315-329.
44. Knobe, J. and Fraser, B. (2008). Causal judgment and moral judgment: Two experiments. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, vol. 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
45. Knobe, J., Buckwalter, W., Nichols, S., Robbins, P., Sarkissian, H. and Sommers, T. (forthcoming). Experimental philosophy. Annual Review of Psychology.
46. Kornblith, H. (1998). The role of intuition In philosophical inquiry: An account with no unnatural ingredients. In M. DePaul and W. Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 129-141.
47. Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
48. Licht, B. and Dweck, C. (1984). Determinants of academic achievement: The interaction of children's achievement orientations with skill area. Developmental Psychology, 20:628-636.
49. Livengood, J., Sytsma, J., Feltz, A., Scheines, R. and Machery, E. (forthcoming). Philosophical temperament. Philosophical Psychology.
50. Ludwig, K. (2007). The epistemology of thought experiments: First vs. third person approaches. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Philosophy and the Empirical, 31:128-159.
51. Mallon, R., Machery, E., Nichols, S. and Stich, S. (2009). Against arguments from reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79:332-356.
52. Nahmias, E., Coates, D. and Kvaran, T. (2007). Free will, moral responsibility and mechanism: Experiments on folk intuition. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 31:214-242.
53. Nichols, S., Stich, S. and Weinberg, J. (2003). Meta-skepticism: Meditations on ethnoepistemology. In S. Luper (ed.), The Skeptics. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 227-247.
54. Paxton, M., Figdor, C. and Tiberius, V. (in preparation). Quantifying the gender gap: An empirical study of the underrepresentation of women in philosophy.
55. Pessin, A. and Goldberg, S. (eds.) (1996). The Twin Earth Chronicles: Twenty Years of Reflection on Hilary Putnam's 'The Meaning of Meaning'. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
56. Plato (1892). The Republic in The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. I (B. Jowett, Trans.). New York:Random House.
57. Pizarro, D., Uhlmann, E. and Bloom, P. (2003). Causal deviance and the attribution of moral responsibility. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39:653-660.
58. Putnam, H. (1973). Meaning and reference. Journal of Philosophy, 70:699-711.
59. Rigdon, M., Ishii, K., Watabe, M. and Kitayama, S. (2009). Minimal social cues in the dictator game. Journal of Economic Psychology, 30:358-367.
60. Saul, J. (forthcoming). Unconscious influences and women in philosophy. In F. Jenkins and K. Hutchison (eds.), Women in Philosophy: What Needs to Change?
61. Schaffer, J. and Knobe, J. (forthcoming). Contrastivism surveyed. Nous. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00795.x
62. Searle, J. (1980). Minds, brains and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3:417-457.
63. Smart, J. (1973). An outline of a system of utilitarian ethics. In J. Smart and B. Williams (eds.), Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3-47.
64. Sosa, E. (2007). Experimental philosophy and philosophical intuition. Philosophical Studies, 132:99-107.
65. Sosa, E. (2009). A defense of the use of intuitions In philosophy. In M. Bishop and D. Murphy (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Oxford: Blackwell, 101-112.
66. Starmans, C. and Friedman, O. (2009). Is knowledge subjective? A sex difference in adults' epistemic intuitions. Poster presented at the 6th Biennial Meeting of the Cognitive Development Society, San Antonio, TX, October 16-17. Abstract available at.
67. Stich, S. (2009). Reply to Sosa. In M. Bishop and D. Murphy (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Oxford: Blackwell, 228-236.
68. Stich, S. (in preparation). Experimental philosophy and the bankruptcy of the great tradition.
69. Thomson, J. (1971). A defense of abortion. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, 1:47-66.
70. Vesterlund, L. (2006). Why do people give? In R. Steinberg and W. Powell (eds.), The Nonprofit Sector, 2d ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
71. Weinberg, J. (2007). How to challenge intuitions empirically without risking skepticism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 31:318-343.
72. Weinberg, J., Nichols, S. and Stich, S. (2001). Normativity and epistemic intuitions. Philosophical Topics, 29:429-460.
73. Williamson, T. (2004). Philosophical intuitions and skepticism about judgment. Dialectica, 58:109-153.
74. Williamson, T. (2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.
75. Zamzow, J. and Nichols, S. (2009). Variations in ethical intuitions. Philosophical Issues 19:368-388.