Why we cooperate

The Moral Brain: A Multidisciplinary Perspective

Volumn , Issue , 2015, Pages 87-102

  Jordan, Jillian ^a   Peysakhovich, Alexander ^b   Rand, David G ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84952332247     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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