Imperfect statutes, imperfect courts: Understanding congress’s plan in the era of unorthodox lawmaking

Harvard Law Review

Volumn 129, Issue 1, 2015, Pages 62-111

  Gluck, Abbe R ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84946944479     PISSN: 0017811X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Note

References (329)

1. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496.
2. Cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, As if Republican Interpretation, 97 Yale L.J. 1685, 1686 (1988) ("Any theory of statutory interpretation is at base a theory about constitutional law.").
3. S. Ct. 2480.
4. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
5. Am. Enter. Inst., Who's in Charge? More Legal Challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act at 1:33:00, YouTube (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.youtube.com/watch?&v =C7nRpJURvE4 (remarks of Michael Greve at a Dec. 6, 2010 panel to discuss legal challenges to the ACA).
6. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (failing constitutional challenge to the ACA individual mandate).
7. Am. Enter. Inst., Who's in Charge? More Legal Challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act at 1:33:00, YouTube (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.youtube.com/watch?&v =C7nRpJURvE4 (remarks of Michael Greve at a Dec. 6, 2010 panel to discuss legal challenges to the ACA).
8. Thomas W. Merrill, Essay, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 351, 372 (1994) (arguing this view of textualism treats statutory interpretation like a "puzzle" that "places a great premium on cleverness").
9. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
10. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 545 (1947)
11. Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79 (1939)
12. Palmer, 308 U.S. at 83.
13. U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
14. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496.
15. Thomas W. Merrill, Marbury v. Madison as the First Great Administrative Law Decision, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 481, 520-21 (2004) ("[W]hen Marbury is quoted in a modern Supreme Court opinion, you can be pretty sure it is going to be a duesy - outlawing a controversial type of social legislation, remaking the ground rules of the political system, or perhaps even deciding an election.").
16. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485-89.
17. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Intepretation from the Inside - An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman I].
18. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside - An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 725 (2014) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman II].
19. See John F. Manning, The Supreme Court, 2013 Term - Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 29-30 (2014) (noting the Court's "fundamental shift . . . toward textualism" and the influence of Chevron on many interpretive questions).
20. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
21. N.Y. State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 420 (1973).
22. The term "unorthodox lawmaking" is from Barbara Sinclair, who has chronicled the increase in deviations from conventional legislative process for the past twenty years, since Unorthodox Lawmaking (1st ed. 1997).
23. Two were opinions from Justice Thomas criticizing Chevron. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
24. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1220 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
25. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2013 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (interpreting federal threat statute).
26. Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1235 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring) (considering whether Amtrak is a governmental entity in a challenge to a statutory delegation).
27. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 851 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (standard of review for patent claim construction).
28. Cristina Marcos & Sarah Ferris, House Votes to Repeal ObamaCare, The Hill (Feb. 3, 2015, 5:07 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/231638-house-votes-to-repeal-obamacare [http://perma.cc/C7FH-LV65].
29. See Manu Raju, John Bresnahan, Jake Sherman & Carrie Budoff Brown, Anatomy of a Shutdown, Politico (Oct. 18, 2013, 12:29 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/anatomy -of-a-shutdown-98518.html [http://perma.cc/37LL-J8FA].
30. S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
31. Bruce Ackerman, We the People: The Civil Rights Revolution (2014).
32. William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes (2010).
33. David A. Super, The Modernization of American Public Law: Health Care Reform and Popular Constitutionalism, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 873, 893-94 (2014) (noting that the ACA's fate remains contested).
34. As this Comment went to press, another challenge - this one by the House of Representatives over the appropriation of different ACA funds - survived its first hurdle. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, No. 14-1967, 2015 WL 5294762 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2015) (holding the House had standing to sue).
35. Am. Enter. Inst., Who's in Charge? More Legal Challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act at 1:33:00, YouTube (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.youtube.com/watch?&v =C7nRpJURvE4 (remarks of Michael Greve at a Dec. 6, 2010 panel to discuss legal challenges to the ACA).
36. Linda Greenhouse, Op-Ed., Law in the Raw, N.Y. Times (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/13/opinion/law-in-the-raw.html.
37. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 545 (1947)
38. Am. Enter. Inst., Who's in Charge? More Legal Challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act at 1:33:00, YouTube (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.youtube.com/watch?&v =C7nRpJURvE4 (remarks of Michael Greve at a Dec. 6, 2010 panel to discuss legal challenges to the ACA).
39. Adam Liptak, Lawyer Put Health Act in Peril by Pointing Out 4 Little Words, N.Y. Times (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/03/us/politics/in-four-word-phrase -challenger-spied-health-care-laws-vulnerability.html.
40. Sarah Kliff, The Accidental Case Against Obamacare: How a Lawyer, a Law Professor, and a Libertarian Found the Affordable Care Act's Secret Weakness, Vox (May 26, 2015), http://www.vox.com/2015/3/2/8129539/king-burwell-history [http://perma.cc/VXP9-JM4X].
41. U.S.C. § 18041 (2012).
42. See, e.g., Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Yes to State Exchanges, Nat'l Rev. Online (Dec. 6, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/334956/yes-state-exchanges-douglas-holtz-eakin [http://perma.cc/RTH8-XADF] (calling federal exchanges the ACA's "single-payer Trojan Horse").
43. The Affordable Care Act's Health Insurance Marketplaces by Type, Commonwealth Fund, http://www.commonwealthfund.org/interactives-and-data/maps-and-data/state-exchange -map (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/8QS8-9TWQ].
44. Linda J. Blumberg, Matthew Buettgens & John Holahan, Urban Inst., The Implications of a Supreme Court Finding for the Plaintiff in King vs. Burwell: 8.2 Million More Uninsured and 35% Higher Premiums (Jan. 2015), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files /alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000062-The-Implications-King-vs-Burwell.pdf [http://perma.cc/2K4W -P7HT].
45. Brief Amici Curiae for Bipartisan Economic Scholars in Support of Respondents at 2-5, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114).
46. Brief of the American Hospital Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114). The ACA allows an individual to exempt herself from the mandate if the cost of insurance exceeds eight percent of her income, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1)(A) (2012), which is why the subsidies are critical to sustain the mandate.
47. Am. Enter. Inst., Who's in Charge? More Legal Challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act at 1:33:00, YouTube (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.youtube.com/watch?&v =C7nRpJURvE4 (remarks of Michael Greve at a Dec. 6, 2010 panel to discuss legal challenges to the ACA).
48. Reply Brief at 13, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114).
49. Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. U.S. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
50. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-393) ("JUSTICE SCALIA: [W]hat happened to the Eighth Amendment? You really want us to go through these 2,700 pages? . . . [D]o you really expect the Court to do that? Or do you expect us to give this function to our law clerks?").
51. U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (2012).
52. Brief for Petitioners at 20, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114).
53. Helvering v. Nw. Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 311 U.S. 46, 49 (1940).
54. U.S.C. ch. 157, subch. III, pt. C (2012).
55. See Brief for the Respondents at 23, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114).
56. U.S.C. §§ 300gg-91(d)(21), 18031(b)(1), 18031(d)(1).
57. See Brief for the Respondents at 23, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114).
58. U.S.C. § 36B(f)(3) (2012).
59. See Brief for the Respondents at 23, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114).
60. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
61. Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon, Another ObamaCare Glitch, Wall St. J. (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203687504577006322431330662.
62. Am. Enter. Inst., Who's in Charge? More Legal Challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act at 1:33:00, YouTube (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.youtube.com/watch?&v =C7nRpJURvE4 (remarks of Michael Greve at a Dec. 6, 2010 panel to discuss legal challenges to the ACA).
63. Brief for Petitioners at 20, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114).
64. ACA "key architect" Jonathan Gruber; several legislative history reports, including Senate Democratic Policy Comm., Fact Check: Responding to Opponents of Health Insurance Reform (Sept. 21, 2009), http://dpc.senate.gov/reform/reform-factcheck -092109.pdf [http://perma.cc/MLS8-NM7P].
65. House Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform and House Comm. on Ways & Means, 113th Cong., Administration Conducted Inadequate Review of Key Issues Prior to Expanding Health Law's Taxes and Subsidies 4 (2014) (referring to President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Affordable Care Act (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press -office/2013/09/26/remarks-president-affordable-care-act [http://perma.cc/P232-SL3T]).
66. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 407 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
67. Brief of Jonathan H. Adler and Michael F. Cannon as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114) ("[T]he rule actually subverts congressional intent by altering the balance Congress struck between the Act's competing goals.").
68. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 16-17, 55-57, 75, 77, 79-80, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114) (raising questions related to the federalism canon).
69. S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
70. Compare Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2272 n.10 (2014).
71. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2236-37 (2014) (describing potential conflict between the implied repeals canon and the presumption of full effect).
72. Compare Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2090 (2014).
73. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Did Federalism Rescue Obamacare?, Justia: Verdict (Mar. 11, 2015), http://verdict.justia.com/2015/03/11/federalism-rescue-obamacare[http://perma.cc /V8Z9-UYDH].
74. S. Ct. 2566, 2594 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (accepting the Government's invitation to "interpret the mandate as imposing a tax, if it would otherwise violate the Constitution").
75. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2085-86.
76. Josh Blackman, Bond Dissolves with Federalism, Josh Blackman's Blog (June 2, 2014), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2014/06/02/bond -dissolves-with-federalism [http://perma.cc/UR4A-VJML] (comparing the exit strategy used in NFIB and Bond).
77. James R. Copland, Bond v. U.S., PointofLaw.com (June 4, 2014, 11:32 AM), http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/2014/06/bond-v-us.php [http://perma.cc/4FED-HL7S] (same).
78. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485-87.
79. N.Y. State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 419-20 (1973).
80. Dep't of Revenue v. ACF Indus., 510 U.S. 332, 343 (1994).
81. Brief for Petitioners at 20, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114).
82. Among these responses were rebuttals from federal and state officials, see, e.g., Brief of the Commonwealths of Virginia et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 16-17.
83. Brief of Members of Congress and State Legislatures as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3-4, 11-15.
84. Tom Harkin, Ron Wyden, Sander M. Levin, George Miller & Henry A. Waxman, Affordable Care Act Opponents Are Cherry-Picking Their History, Wash. Post (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www .washingtonpost.com/opinions/affordable-care-act-opponents-are-cherry-picking-their-history/2014 /10/30/2199a04e-5fac-11e4-91f7-5d89b5e8c251_story.html [http://perma.cc/337G-ZPQH].
85. Robert Pear, Four Words that Imperil Health Care Law Were All a Mistake, Writers Now Say, N.Y. Times (May 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/us/politics/contested-words-in -affordable-care-act-may-have-been-left-by-mistake.html (summarizing author's interviews with more than two dozen Democrats and Republicans involved in writing the law).
86. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Rep. Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform (Dec. 6, 2012).
87. Letter from Sen. Benjamin Nelson to Sen. Robert P. Casey, Jr. (Jan. 27, 2015), http://theusconstitution.org/sites/default/files/briefs/Senator_Casey _re_King_v_Burwell-27_JAN_2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/7ZP6-GVHP] ("I always believed that tax credits should be available in all 50 states regardless of who built the exchange, and the final law also reflects that belief as well."), and reporters who covered the ACA's enactment.
88. Steven Brill, The Supreme Court Hears an Obamacare Fairytale, Reuters (Mar. 2, 2015), http://blogs .reuters.com/great-debate/2015/03/02/the-supreme-court-hears-an-obamacare-fairytale [http://perma.cc/QV97-Q8AQ].
89. Ezra Klein, The Weirdest Obamacare Theory Yet, Vox (July 28, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.vox.com/2014/7/28/5942933/Obamacare-Halbig-Gruber [http://perma .cc/R3J3-Y68J].
90. Sarah Kliff, Congress Had Lots of Obamacare Fights. Ending Some Subsidies Wasn't One of Them, Vox (July 26, 2014, 2:30 PM), http://www.vox.com/2014/7/26/5937593 /obamacare-halbig-gruber-tax-credits [http://perma.cc/EBM2-EMPS].
91. Compare, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 18041 (2012) ("State flexibility in operation and enforcement of Exchanges and related requirements . . . . (c) Failure to establish Exchange or implement requirements"), with S. 1679, 111th Cong. § 3104 (2009) ("Allowing State Flexibility . . . . (d) Federal Fallback in the Case of States That Refuse to Improve Health Care Coverage"). Notably, one provision not copied was a provision in the HELP bill that would have penalized states for not running their own exchanges. See S. 1679 § 3104(d). The Court has long applied a "rejected proposal rule," under which it refuses to construe statutes to incorporate provisions that Congress has expressly rejected.
92. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600-01 (1983).
93. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972).
94. S. 1796, 111th Cong. § 2225(b) (2009).
95. Chairman of the S. Comm. on Fin., 111th Cong., Chairman's Mark: America's Healthy Future Act of 2009, at 11, 20 (2009).
96. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2505 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. See Brief of Health Care Policy History Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114), at 18. Compare S. 1679, with S. 1796. The last such mention was a cross-reference in the Finance bill but spelled out in the final ACA. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(A)(i) (2012), with S. 1796 § 36B(c)(2)(A)(i).
98. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside - An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 762-63 (2014) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman II].
99. Abbe R. Gluck, Why Health Lawyers Must Be Public-Law Lawyers: Health Law in the Age of the Modern Regulatory State, 18 J. Health Care L. & Pol'y 323, 325-29 (2015).
100. See H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (2010).
101. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside - An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 763 (2014) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman II].
102. Democrat Paul Kirk was appointed as the interim senator from Massachusetts until the election took place. See Fred Barnes, Kirk Can't Vote After Tuesday, Wkly. Standard: The Blog (Jan. 16, 2010, 10:28 PM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/barnes-massachusetts -senatorial-race-and-obamacare [http://perma.cc/5BHM-YKQN].
103. See Standing Rules of the Senate, S. Doc. No. 113-18, R. XXII § 2, at 16 (2013).
104. Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 Yale L.J. 70, 98 n.112 (2012).
105. Some have speculated that another factor contributing to the lack of cleanup was what may have been less involvement than usual by the relevant agencies - HHS and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services - in the drafting and review of these provisions, perhaps because those agencies have not historically been expert on questions relating to private insurance markets. Thanks to Scott Levy and Jerry Mashaw for this insight.
106. U.S.C. § 641(e) (2012).
107. See 156 Cong. Rec. H2206 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2010).
108. U.S.C. § 36B(f)(3) (2012).
109. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 522-24 (1989).
110. Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 Yale L.J. 70, 98 n.112 (2012).
111. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492.
112. It is intriguing, however, that several of the cases cited by the Court for the interpretive approach it ultimately does apply are cases in which the federalism canon played an important role, even if unmentioned in the King opinion. See, e.g., Dep't of Revenue v. ACF Indus., 510 U.S. 332, 345-48 (1994).
113. Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 84-85 (1939)
114. Ilya Somin, Federalism Arguments in King v. Burwell, Wash. Post.: Volokh Conspiracy (Mar. 7, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com /news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/03/07/federalism-arguments-in-king-v-burwell/ [http://perma .cc/6H9W-2TJD] (arguing the canon cannot be used to "expand" federal power); my firm disagreement with this proposition must await another day. As noted, I filed a brief in the case on the applicability of the canon.
115. See generally Scott J. Shapiro, Legality (2011).
116. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2946.
117. James Blumstein, Some Reflections on King v. Burwell, Casetext (July 6, 2015), http://casetext.com/posts/some-reflections-on-king-v-burwell.
118. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
119. A Westlaw advanced search, from Aug. 13-Aug. 18, 2015, of ("congress! plan" OR "statut! plan" OR "legislat! plan" % redistricting) yielded 132 opinions mentioning the concept, of which research assistants determined 31 were false positives (cases that used the word "plan" but not in reference to a legislative plan as in King).
120. See Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 753, 757 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck, Federal Common Law].
121. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Intepretation: Methodology as "Law" and the Erie Doctrine, 120 Yale L.J. 1898 (2011) [hereinafter Gluck, Intersystemic].
122. See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi, Obamacare as a Window on Judicial Strategy, 80 Tenn. L. Rev. 763, 827-41 (2013).
123. Ilya Shapiro, Fear and Loathing at One First Street, 18 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 357, 367-71 (2014) (book review).
124. Lincoln Caplan, John Roberts's Court, New Yorker (June 29, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-chief-justice [http://perma.cc/9T2X-MQY7].
125. See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev. 419, 430 n.34, 444 n.84 (2005).
126. Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 117, 131-33 (2009).
127. John F. Manning, The Supreme Court, 2013 Term - Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 22-29 (2014).
128. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 642 (1990).
129. John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 673, 685 (1997).
130. Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 749, 754-56 (2013).
131. Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next Step, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 431, 443-44 (1930).
132. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 170-73 (2012).
133. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
134. Brief for Petitioners at 20, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114).
135. See Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 148 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
136. John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 113, 155 (claiming that Congress and the courts "share[] a rich set of established background conventions" (emphasis omitted)).
137. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 517.
138. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2091 (2014) (calling federalism canon a "background assumption").
139. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013) ("Chevron . . . provides a stable background rule against which Congress can legislate . . . .").
140. Nat'l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582, 590 (1995) (calling tax canon a "strong background presumption").
141. John F. Manning, Continuity and the Legislative Design, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1863, 1864-65 (2004).
142. John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear Statement Rules, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 771, 801-02.
143. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 170-73 (2012).
144. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside - An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 725 (2014) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman II].
145. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside - An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 725 (2014) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman II].
146. Abbe R. Gluck, Symposium: The Grant in King: Obamacare Subsidies as Textualism's Big Test, SCOTUSblog (Nov. 7, 2014, 12:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/11/symposium -the-grant-in-king-obamacare-subsidies-as-textualisms-big-test [http://perma.cc/77U5-8S8N].
147. Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1610, 1613 (2012) (citation omitted).
148. See Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 753, 757 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck, Federal Common Law].
149. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Intepretation: Methodology as "Law" and the Erie Doctrine, 120 Yale L.J. 1898 (2011) [hereinafter Gluck, Intersystemic].
150. See, e.g., Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 1317, 1466 (2014) (noting frequency of congressional overrides of lenity applications because legislators like to be tough on crime).
151. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1824-25 (2010) [hereinafter States as Laboratories] (noting that many state legislatures have attempted to override by statute the application of courts' favorite rules, including the rule of lenity and the common law derogation canon).
152. See John F. Manning, Inside Congress's Mind, 115 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015) (acknowledging this limitation but arguing that canons still could serve as coordinating rules for lawyers and judges).
153. See Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes 52-53 (2014) (detailing the lack of communication and shared conventions across the branches).
154. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside - An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 725 (2014) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman II].
155. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 540 (1983) ("[Canons] spare legislators the need to decide and announce, law by law, the rules that will be used for interpreting the code of words they select.").
156. Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 25 (1997).
157. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 61, 63 (1994) (advocating "understandable commands, consistently interpreted," "confin[ing] judges," "not because . . . language is simple and statutory commands 'plain'; instead the concern is that only a relatively mechanical approach can be reconciled with the premises of democratic governance").
158. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1824-25 (2010) [hereinafter States as Laboratories] (noting that many state legislatures have attempted to override by statute the application of courts' favorite rules, including the rule of lenity and the common law derogation canon).
159. See Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 753, 757 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck, Federal Common Law].
160. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 401-06 (1950) (presenting the idea that for every canon, there is an opposing canon).
161. See Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 753, 757 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck, Federal Common Law].
162. See Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2272 n.10 (2014).
163. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2090 (2014).
164. Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 25 (1997).
165. See, e.g., Simon Lazarus, John Roberts to America: I'm in Charge Here, New Republic (June 27, 2015), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/122188/john-roberts-america-im-charge-here [http://perma.cc/HYG5-BMNP].
166. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Reflections on Judging 209-18 (2013).
167. U.S. 193 (1979).
168. Professor Philip P. Frickey called Weber the "case most responsible" for the "embrace" of textualism. Philip P. Frickey, John Minor Wisdom Lecture: Wisdom on Weber, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 1169, 1184 (2000). Thanks to Professor John Manning for this insightful comparison.
169. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Intepretation: Methodology as "Law" and the Erie Doctrine, 120 Yale L.J. 1898 (2011) [hereinafter Gluck, Intersystemic].
170. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 545 (1947)
171. Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 25 (1997).
172. Max Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 Harv. L. Rev 388, 424 (1942).
173. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492-96 (citations omitted).
174. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside - An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 967-71 (2014) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman II].
175. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside - An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 741-44 (2014) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman II].
176. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside - An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 725 (2014) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman II].
177. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside - An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 725 (2014) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman II].
178. See John F. Manning, Inside Congress's Mind, 115 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015) (acknowledging this limitation but arguing that canons still could serve as coordinating rules for lawyers and judges).
179. Some may believe that the Court secretly consulted legislative history or other outside sources to understand the ACA. The role of bloggers and the press in the case is detailed in Part III. But, notably, those external sources did not themselves generally rely on the ACA's legislative history (in part because the ACA's unorthodox enactment made its legislative history convoluted), but rather on how the pieces of the ACA itself - the mandate, the exchanges, the subsidies - make no sense unless they work together.
180. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 529 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
181. Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 476 U.S. 877, 885 (1986).
182. Great American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 373-75 (1979)
183. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission, 380 U.S. 685, 688-89 (1965)
184. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948)
185. Hines v. Lowrey, 305 U.S. 85, 88-89 (1938).
186. Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process 1124-25 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (1958).
187. Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 19 n.2 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
188. Thanks to Professor Peter Strauss for this insight.
189. See John F. Manning, Inside Congress's Mind, 115 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015) (acknowledging this limitation but arguing that canons still could serve as coordinating rules for lawyers and judges).
190. U.S. 457 (1892).
191. There are very rare exceptions, the most recent being Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department of Education, 550 U.S. 81 (2007), in which Justice Breyer's majority opinion began with purpose instead of text.
192. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2490-93.
193. See Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
194. N.Y. State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 420 (1973).
195. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 53 (2006).
196. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2085, 2139 (2002).
197. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2493.
198. Numerous commentators have remarked on the role of objective purpose in textualism. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 59, 65-66 (1988).
199. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 90 (2006).
200. Miranda McGowan, Do As I Do, Not As I Say: An Empirical Investigation of Justice Scalia's Ordinary Meaning Method of Statutory Interpretation, 78 Miss. L.J. 129-136, 172-74 (2008).
201. of the 101 references to statutory plans occurred before 1990.
202. U.S. 678 (1987).
203. S. Ct. 2566, 2668-69 (2012) (joint dissent).
204. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
205. Henry Paul Monaghan, Essay, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 665 (2012) (detailing variety of alternative bases of avoidance rule).
206. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) ("Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions - it does not . . . hide elephants in mouseholes.").
207. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 229-32 (1994).
208. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside - An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 725 (2014) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman II].
209. Justice Scalia authored the majority opinions in both Whitman and MCI.
210. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
211. Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process 1124-25 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (1958).
212. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 239 (1986).
213. Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377, 30,378 (May 23, 2012) ("Under the proposed regulations, the term Exchange has the same meaning as in 45 CFR 155.20, which provides that the term Exchange refers to a State Exchange, regional Exchange, subsidiary Exchange, and Federally-facilitated Exchange.").
214. S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
215. S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
216. U.S. 967 (2005).
217. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712-14 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
218. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2529 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
219. Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1961 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
220. Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240-45 (2015).
221. U.S. 218 (1994).
222. U.S. 120 (2000).
223. U.S. 218 (2001).
224. See generally Abbe R. Gluck, What 30 Years of Chevron Teach Us About the Rest of Statutory Interpretation, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 607 (2014).
225. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
226. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 243-45 (2006) (calling major questions a "nondelegation canon").
227. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 953, 964 & n.48 (1994).
228. But at least one court of appeals has already used the concept. See Berman v. NEO@Ogilvy LLC, No. 14-4626, 2015 WL 5254916, at *5 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 2015) (citing King for methodology of looking to the statute as a whole to interpret internal tensions in the Dodd-Frank Act).
229. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492 (internal citations omitted).
230. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside - An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 725 (2014) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman II].
231. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside - An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 725 (2014) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman II].
232. Elizabeth Garrett, Attention to Context in Statutory Interpretation: Applying the Lessons of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation to Omnibus Legislation, Issues in Legal Scholarship, Nov. 2002, art. 1, at 6-12, http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art1 (suggesting that omnibus bills raise different interpretive questions than non-omnibus bills).
233. See Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O'Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking: Congress, Courts and Agencies in the Era of Legislative and Regulatory Complexity, 115 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015).
234. See Frederick M. Kaiser, Cong. Research Serv., R41803, Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities: Types, Rationales, Considerations 1-4 & nn.7-19 (2011).
235. Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 207-08.
236. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside - An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 1008 (2014) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman II].
237. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492.
238. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014).
239. See Rapaport v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Office of Thrift Supervision, 59 F.3d 212, 216 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
240. Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 207-08.
241. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside - An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 1007 (2014) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman II].
242. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. But, as noted, the Court does not mention that the IRS interpretation piggybacked off a previous interpretation by HHS, the lead agency.
243. U.S. 243 (2006).
244. Attorney General's interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act as criminalizing physician-assisted suicide and concluding that the decision should lie with the Secretary of HHS.
245. Cf. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2500 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Affordable Care Act spans 900 pages; it would be amazing if its provisions all lined up perfectly with each other.").
246. See Schoolhouse Rock!, I'm Just a Bill, YouTube (last visited Sept. 27, 2015), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tyeJ55o3El0 (famous schoolchild's cartoon following the conventional path a bill takes to become a law).
247. See Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O'Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking: Congress, Courts and Agencies in the Era of Legislative and Regulatory Complexity, 115 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015).
248. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside - An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 725 (2014) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman II].
249. See Theodore L. Garrett & Sonya D. Winner, A Clean Air Act Primer: Part III, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. 10321, 10321 (1992).
250. See Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O'Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking: Congress, Courts and Agencies in the Era of Legislative and Regulatory Complexity, 115 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015).
251. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 545 (1947)
252. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492 (emphasis added) (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014)); cf. Seinfeld: The Yada Yada (NBC television broadcast Apr. 24, 1997), Hulu, http://www.hulu.com/watch/807615 (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) ("But you yada yada'd over the best part!").
253. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 545 (1947)
254. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2495.
255. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 537 (1947)
256. See Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work 92-102 (2010).
257. Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 193-203 (2008).
258. See Linda Greenhouse, The Roberts Court's Reality Check, N.Y. Times (June 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/opinion/the-roberts-courts-reality-check.html?.
259. Rachel Sachs, Happy About the Supreme Court's ACA Decision? Thank a Law Professor, The Conversation (June 26, 2015, 10:16 PM), http://theconversation.com/happy-about-the-supreme-courts-aca -decision-thank-a-law-professor-43889. Several important briefs were also filed at the appellate level.
260. Brief Amici Curiae of Members of Congress and State Legislatures in Support of Appellees and Affirmance, King, 759 F.3d 358 (No. 14-1158).
261. But cf. Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon, King v. Burwell and the Triumph of Selective Contextualism, 2014-2015 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. (forthcoming) (arguing that the Court was selective in what provisions it deemed part of Congress's plan and what provisions it was willing to ignore).
262. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492.
263. Cf. generally Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble With Amicus Facts, 100 Va. L. Rev. 1757 (2014) (highlighting dangers of the Court's increasing reliance on outside experts for central case facts).
264. Am. Enter. Inst., Who's in Charge? More Legal Challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act at 1:33:00, YouTube (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.youtube.com/watch?&v =C7nRpJURvE4 (remarks of Michael Greve at a Dec. 6, 2010 panel to discuss legal challenges to the ACA).
265. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (No. 12- 1281), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments/argumenttranscripts/12-1281pm02.pdf [http: // perma . cc/ 5 ZPP- 35 4 K].
266. See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2089 (2014).
267. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 738 (2008).
268. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside - An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 725 (2014) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman II].
269. See Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O'Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking: Congress, Courts and Agencies in the Era of Legislative and Regulatory Complexity, 115 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015).
270. See Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O'Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking: Congress, Courts and Agencies in the Era of Legislative and Regulatory Complexity, 115 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015).
271. See Abbe R. Gluck, The "CBO Canon" and the Debate over Tax Credits on Federally Operated Health Insurance Exchanges, Balkinization (July 10, 2012), http://balkin.blogspot.com /2012/07/cbo-canon-and-debate-over-tax-credits.html [http://perma.cc/A9A5-87BQ] (introducing notion of CBO canon and its relevance for King).
272. See, e.g., Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1019 (Kavanaugh, J.) (D.C. Cir. 2014) (recognizing Congress is sometimes redundant and so rejecting application of presumption against superfluities to tax-code question at issue).
273. U.S. 504 (1989).
274. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 91 (2001) (construing the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act's inclusion of Internal Revenue Code chapter 35 as a tax provision applicable to Indian tribes as "simply a drafting mistake, a failure to delete an inappropriate cross-reference in the bill").
275. U.S. 526 (2004).
276. See, e.g., United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 68 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("It is beyond our province to rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and to provide for what we might think . . . is the preferred result.").
277. The joint dissent in NFIB explicitly assumed the statute allowed subsidies on the federal exchanges. Abbe R. Gluck, What the D.C. Circuit Got Wrong About Obamacare, Politico Magazine (July 22, 2014, 8:49 PM), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/07/dc-circuit -got-wrong-about-obamacare-109263.html#.Va8IWkthVUA [http://perma.cc/6WHN-DMME].
278. See C. Stephen Redhead & Janet Kinzer, Cong. Research Serv., R43289, Legislative Actions to Repeal, Defund, or Delay the Affordable Care Act 7-9 tbl.1 (2015) counting a total of thirteen direct amendments to the ACA via authorizing legislation, of which four - Pub. L. No. 114-110 (2015).
279. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599-602 (1983) (presuming congressional ratification of a statutory interpretation when Congress amends a statute post-interpretation without changing it).
280. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2507 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
281. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 Duke L.J. 1215 (2001) (arguing that transformative "super-statutes" deserve special interpretive treatment).
282. Max Huffman, Using All Available Information, 25 Rev. Litig. 501, 518, (2006) (book review).
283. U.S. 649 (1892).
284. Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 197, 197 (1976).
285. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Stefanie Egidy & James Fowkes, Due Process of Lawmaking: The United States, South Africa, Germany, and the European Union (2015) (comparing judicial approaches to reviewing the legislative and administrative processes in different nations).
286. Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation 197 (1999) (emphasizing the importance of deliberation in the legitimacy of legislation).
287. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
288. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492.
289. See Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O'Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking: Congress, Courts and Agencies in the Era of Legislative and Regulatory Complexity, 115 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015).
290. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (providing that "[e]ach House [of Congress] may determine the Rules of its Proceedings").
291. See 2 U.S.C. § 641 (2013).
292. Alexander Bolton, Parliamentarian Rules Against First GOP Objection to Healthcare 'Fixes' Bill, The Hill (March 23, 2010, 10:15 AM), http://thehill.com/home news/senate/88485-parliamentarian-rules-against-first-gop-objection-to-reconciliation-bill [http://perma.cc/XCD8-RB4J].
293. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
294. S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
295. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2493.
296. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2675-76 (2012) (joint dissent).
297. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991) (requiring a clear statement before a statute will be read to displace traditional state functions).
298. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (requiring Congress to provide an "unmistakably" clear statement of intent to abrogate sovereign immunity).
299. U.S. 723 (2008).
300. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2089 (2014).
301. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 170-73 (2012).
302. Cf. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2567 (2014) (refusing to recognize gridlock as an "unusual circumstance" that could demand recess-appointment power during a very short congressional break).
303. Josh Blackman, Justice Kennedy Discusses Gridlock During Hill Testimony. Yes, There Is a King v. Burwell Connection, Josh Blackman's Blog (Mar. 23, 2015), http://joshblackman .com/blog/2015/03/23/justice-kennedy-discusses-gridlock-during-hill-testimony-yes-there-is-a-king |-v-burwell-connection/ [http://perma.cc/ECA6-R28K].
304. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) ("[S]tare decisis carries enhanced force when a decision . . . interprets a statute. . . . Congress can correct any mistake it sees.").
305. See, e.g., CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 451-52 (2008).
306. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008).
307. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7 (1987).
308. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283-84 (1972).
309. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (No. 12- 1281), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments/argumenttranscripts/12-1281pm02.pdf [http: // perma . cc/ 5 ZPP- 35 4 K].
310. See, e.g., Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 1317, 1466 (2014) (noting frequency of congressional overrides of lenity applications because legislators like to be tough on crime).
311. Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. Cal. L. Rev. 205, 209 (2013).
312. See, e.g., John C. Nagle, Textualism's Exceptions, Issues in Legal Scholarship, Nov. 2002, art.15, at 4 ("The textualist reluctance to accept judicial correction of statutory mistakes emphasizes the legislature's ability to correct its own mistakes.").
313. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, Commentary, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1417, 1426-34 (1987).
314. Robert A. Katzmann & Russell R. Wheeler, A Mechanism for "Statutory Housekeeping": Appellate Courts Working with Congress, 9 J. App. Prac. & Process 131, 133-36 (2007).
315. John Copeland Nagle, Essay, Corrections Day, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1267, 1280-85 (1996).
316. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 545 (1947)
317. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014).
318. See Richard H. Pildes, Institutional Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and Public Law, 2013 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 2.
319. See generally Richard H. Fallon Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler's the Federal Courts and the Federal System (6th ed. 2009).
320. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
321. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
322. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
323. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015).
324. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
325. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
326. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
327. See Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1950-52 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (expressing concern about infringement on the judiciary).
328. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2611-15 (creating further doctrinal uncertainty on the status of the public/private rights distinction in the context of Congress's power to create non-Article III courts).
329. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 413-14 (9th Cir. 2014) (questioning whether Congress may confer Article III standing by creating a private right of action based solely on a violation of a federal statute), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (2015).