The modernization of American public law: Health care reform and popular constitutionalism

Stanford Law Review

Volumn 66, Issue 4, 2014, Pages 873-952

  Super, David A ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; FORECASTING; GOVERNMENT; GOVERNMENT REGULATION; HEALTH CARE DELIVERY; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HUMAN; LEGAL ASPECT; ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT; POLICY; POLITICS; PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP; SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY; SOCIAL SECURITY; TAX; UNITED STATES;

CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS; DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE; FEDERAL GOVERNMENT; FORECASTING; GOVERNMENT REGULATION; HEALTH CARE REFORM; HEALTH POLICY; HUMANS; PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT; POLITICS; PRIVATIZATION; PUBLIC POLICY; PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSHIPS; SOCIAL SECURITY; SOCIAL VALUES; STATE GOVERNMENT; TAXES; UNITED STATES;

EID: 84887951431     PISSN: 00389765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (459)

1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
2. As part of the agreement that led to the ACA's passage in the House, Congress immediately amended the ACA with the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA), Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). All discussion in this Article refers to the ACA as amended by the HCERA.
3. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
4. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o) (2012) (denying food assistance to many unemployed, childless adults below age fifty, thereby reducing expenditures on the supplemental nutrition assistance program).
5. See 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1) (2012) (allowing points of order against provisions with negligible or negative fiscal impacts).
6. David A. Super, From the Greenhouse to the Poorhouse: Carbon-Emissions Control and the Rules of Legislative Joinder, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1093, 1131 (2010) (describing constraining effects of reconciliation).
7. Ceci Connolly, How We Got Here, in Landmark: The Inside Story of America's New Health-Care Law and What It Means for Us All (2010).
8. Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
9. See David A. Super, The Quiet "Welfare" Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program in the Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1271, 1382-83 (2004) (discussing debates over later farm bill).
10. See As Health Care Law Proceeds, Opposition and Uncertainty Persist, Pew Research Ctr. (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/09/16/as-health-carelaw-proceeds-opposition-and-uncertainty-persist.
11. To be sure, a Republican Senate majority could eliminate the filibuster for legislation just as the current Democratic majority did for most presidential appointments. Cf. Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use of the Filibuster, N.Y. Times (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/us/politics/reid-sets-in-motion-steps-to-limituse-of-filibuster.html.
12. See Editorial, It's Still Too Unacceptably Hard to Staff the Government, Wash. Post (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/its-still-too-hard-to-confirm-presidentialnominees/ 2014/02/17/228634f6-94fd-11e3-84e1-27626c5ef5fb_story.html. Republicans' relatively rapid return to business as usual suggests, however, that this sort of confrontation is profoundly risky for a party out of power and lacking the sympathies of a clear electoral majority.
13. See Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 Yale L.J. 871, 874 (1971) (setting out the proposed interpretation of a constitutional amendment at the outset of its ratification process).
14. See Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 Yale L.J. 871, 874 (1971) (setting out the proposed interpretation of a constitutional amendment at the outset of its ratification process).
15. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
16. See, e.g., Courts & the Constitution: Restoring the Rule of Law, Mitt Romney for President, http://web.archive.org/web/20120911015053/http://www.mittromney.com/ issues/courts-constitution.
17. See, e.g., Courts & the Constitution: Restoring the Rule of Law, Mitt Romney for President, http://web.archive.org/web/20120911015053/http://www.mittromney.com/ issues/courts-constitution.
18. 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that sovereign immunity barred suits filed by citizens against their own states despite the Eleventh Amendment's language eliminating only suits by citizens of a different state).
19. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding state limits on birth control unconstitutional without identifying a clear textual basis).
20. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (prohibiting such titles).
21. Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1737, 1741-47 (2007).
22. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 7-10 (1998).
23. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
24. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
25. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 7-10 (1998).
26. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
27. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 199-207 (1962) (criticizing the reach of judicial power).
28. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 4-5, 43-72 (1980) (arguing that many theories of constitutionalism are antidemocratic).
29. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 199-207 (1962) (criticizing the reach of judicial power).
30. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 73-75, (1980) (arguing that many theories of constitutionalism are antidemocratic).
31. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 5 (1998).
32. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 71-80 (1998).
33. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 8-15 (1998).
34. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 81-83 (1998).
35. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
36. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 33-65 (1998).
37. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 99-185 (1998).
38. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 255-344 (1998).
39. The Federalist No. 40, at 254-55 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
40. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 4-5 (1998).
41. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 89-90 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (finding continued tenure in rental housing a fundamental right protected by the Equal Protection Clause).
42. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) (explaining that the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments codified preexisting rights).
43. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
44. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
45. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
46. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
47. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
48. The Constitution may not be amended by ordinary legislation.
49. See Jane J. Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA 29-35 (1986).
50. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 389-403 (1998).
51. U.S. Const. amend. XVII.
52. U.S. Const. amend. XXII.
53. U.S. Const. amend. XX.
54. U.S. Const. amend. XXV.
55. With the notable exception of the Fourteenth Amendment, every amendment-and certainly every amendment since the Bill of Rights-has been drafted as if bound by the kind of "single subject rule" common in state constitutions. See, e.g., Harbor v. Deukmejian, 742 P.2d 1290, 1298-1304 (Cal. 1987) (applying such a rule to strike down multipurpose legislation).
56. See U.S. Const. amend. XII (providing for the election of the President and Vice President as a slate).
57. See U.S. Const. amend. XII (providing for the election of the President and Vice President as a slate).
58. Alabama has taken this route, resulting in a book-length constitution and a legislature that must propose constitutional amendments before undertaking most significant policy initiatives. See, e.g., Ala. Const. amend. 732 (regulating bingo games in the town of White Hall).
59. Alabama has taken this route, resulting in a book-length constitution and a legislature that must propose constitutional amendments before undertaking most significant policy initiatives. See, e.g., Ala. Const. amend. 732 (regulating bingo games in the town of White Hall).
60. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
61. The concept of an integrated contract, if not the modern terminology, was certainly understood at the time the original written Constitution and Bill of Rights were drafted. See Arthur L. Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 Yale L.J. 603, 607 (1944).
62. John H. Wigmore, A Brief History of the Parol Evidence Rule, 4 Colum. L. Rev. 338, 347 (1904).
63. Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 Va. L. Rev. 223, 230 (1983), absent indications to the contrary, one might imagine them thinking of the written document as the totality of the agreement among the People.
64. See U.S. Const. amend. IX.
65. See U.S. Const. amend. IX.
66. See, e.g., Preston v. Merceau, (1779) 96 Eng. Rep. 736 (K.B.) 736.
67. 2 Black. W. 1249, 1250 ("We can neither alter... the two things expressed in this agreement. With respect to collateral matters it might be otherwise. He might shew who is to put the house in repair, or the like, concerning which nothing is said.... " (citation omitted).
68. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
69. See Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World 63-66 (2011) (discussing the role of popular movements in pushing the Court to retreat from unacceptable constitutional positions).
70. Most substantive canons of interpretation, such as the rule of lenity and the presumption against construing statutes as derogating Native American tribal sovereignty, reflect some sort of constitutional penumbra. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971).
71. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts 104-08 (1999) (rejecting conventional wisdom placing judicial review at the center of constitutional law).
72. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
73. See generally Glenn Kessler, Biden's Claim That the GOP Will "Eliminate" Medicare, Wash. Post (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/factchecker/ post/bidens-claim-that-the-gop-will-eliminate-medicare/2011/08/31/gIQAbuZlsJ_ blog.html.
74. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 1762 (1998).
75. Ceci Connolly, How We Got Here, in Landmark: The Inside Story of America's New Health-Care Law and What It Means for Us All (2010).
76. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
77. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
78. Ceci Connolly, How We Got Here, in Landmark: The Inside Story of America's New Health-Care Law and What It Means for Us All (2010).
79. One group called the ACA "every bit as 'intolerable' as the infamous intolerable acts of King George III that provoked the Boston Tea Party. " Jackie Bodnar, FreedomWorks' Constitution Defense Fund Files Supreme Court Legal Brief to Declare Obamacare Unconstitutional, FreedomWorks (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.freedom works.org/press-releases/freedomworks%E2%80%99-constitution-defense-fund-files-supr.
80. See, e.g., Tea Party Rally to Back Virginia AG Cuccinelli's ObamaCare Challenge, Tea Party Patriots (May 9, 2011, 2:39 PM), http://www.teapartypatriots.org/news/ tea-party-rally-to-back-virginia-ag-cuccinelli%E2%80%99s-obamacare-challenge (invoking, generally, "the intentions of the Constitution's drafters" against the ACA).
81. See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 47-50 (1991).
82. Ceci Connolly, How We Got Here, in Landmark: The Inside Story of America's New Health-Care Law and What It Means for Us All (2010).
83. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 7-10 (1998).
84. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 7-10 (1998).
85. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 275-278 (1998).
86. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 280-285 (1998).
87. Alec MacGillis et al., What It Means for Us All, in Landmark: The Inside Story of America's New Health-Care Law and What It Means for Us All, at 63, 68.
88. Alec MacGillis et al., What It Means for Us All, in Landmark: The Inside Story of America's New Health-Care Law and What It Means for Us All, at 63, 68.
89. Ceci Connolly, How We Got Here, in Landmark: The Inside Story of America's New Health-Care Law and What It Means for Us All (2010).
90. Ceci Connolly, How We Got Here, in Landmark: The Inside Story of America's New Health-Care Law and What It Means for Us All (2010).
91. See Press Release, Nat'l Org. for Women, Health Care Reform Victory Comes with Tragic Setback for Women's Rights (Mar. 21, 2010), available at http://www.now.org/press/03-10/03-21b.html (claiming that the bill's "sweeping antiabortion provision" was included to satisfy "the Catholic bishops and extremist abortion rights opponents").
92. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 24-25 (1998).
93. Michael Cooper, Conservatives Sowed Idea of Health Care Mandate, Only to Spurn It Later, N.Y. Times (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/15/health/ policy/health-care-mandate-was-first-backed-by-conservatives.html.
94. see also Stuart M. Butler, Assuring Affordable Health Care for All Americans, Heritage Found. (Oct. 1, 1989), http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/assuring-affordable-health-care-for-all-americans.
95. See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: The Civil Rights Revolution 30-31, 78-79 (2014) (describing the failure of the first Reconstruction when all three branches of the federal government abandoned the newly enacted constitutional amendments).
96. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 25 (1998).
97. See, e.g., Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011).
98. John Carroll, Many States Preparing Laws Rejecting Individual Mandate, Managed Care (Mar. 2010), http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/1003/1003.mandate.html.
99. Reid Wilson, Wyoming Governor Says No to Medicaid Expansion, Wash. Post (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2013/12/02/wyoming-governor-says-noto-medicaid-expansion.
100. See The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act on Statewide Ballots, Nat'l Conf. St. Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/affordablecare-act-on-the-ballot.aspx (last updated Nov. 7, 2012).
101. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 25 (1998).
102. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
103. See James Hohmann, Pelosi: People Won't Appreciate Reform Until It Passes, Politico (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.politico.com/livepulse/0310/Pelosi_People_wont_ appreciate_reform_until_it_passes.html.
104. See American bridge 21st, Steve Womack on the Unemployment, AR 08/27/13, YouTube (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0HgzD9RmCI.
105. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
106. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
107. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
108. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
109. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 323 (1998).
110. See Norman W. Spaulding, Professional Independence in the Office of the Attorney General, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1931, 1966-68 (2008).
111. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012) ("But the Court does not express any opinion on the wisdom of the Affordable Care Act. Under the Constitution, that judgment is reserved to the people. ").
112. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012) ("But the Court does not express any opinion on the wisdom of the Affordable Care Act. Under the Constitution, that judgment is reserved to the people. ").
113. Ceci Connolly, How We Got Here, in Landmark: The Inside Story of America's New Health-Care Law and What It Means for Us All (2010).
114. See David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Democrats Divided over Reid Proposal for Public Option, N.Y. Times (Oct. 27, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/28/ health/policy/28health.html (explaining that some preferred a system with more government control).
115. Ceci Connolly, How We Got Here, in Landmark: The Inside Story of America's New Health-Care Law and What It Means for Us All (2010).
116. See January Angeles, Ctr. on Budget & Pol'y Priorities, How Health Reform's Medicaid Expansion Will Impact State Budgets (2012), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/7-12-12health.pdf (noting that the federal government will bear nearly all costs).
117. See 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1)(A)-(B), (E) (2012) (prohibiting inclusion in reconciliation bills of any provisions with no fiscal effects or with fiscal effects that are merely incidental to their nonbudgetary purposes).
118. To be sure, President Roosevelt had what appeared to be larger majorities in Congress and within public opinion than Democratic advocates of health care reform do today. In fact, his coalition included wildly disparate elements that were already cleaving sharply by the time he proposed the Second New Deal. See Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1, 44 (1996). Today's greater partisanship yields smaller potential majorities but far more party discipline.
119. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 76-78 (1998).
120. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 101, 117 Stat. 2066, 2071-2152 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
121. See, e.g., Milt Freudenheim & Robert Pear, New Medicare Plan Presents a Drug Benefit Conundrum, N.Y. Times (Nov. 4, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/ 04/business/04retiree.html.
122. Robert Pear, Florida Elderly Feel Let Down by Medicare Drug Benefit, N.Y. Times (Nov. 30, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/30/us/floridaelderly-feel-let-down-by-medicare-drug-benefit.html.
123. Robert Pear, In Arizona, Unease over New Medicare Drug Law, N.Y. Times (Apr. 18, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/18/ us/in-arizona-unease-over-new-medicare-drug-law.html?pagewanted=all.
124. See, e.g., U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-07-824T, Medicare Part D: Enrolling New Dual-Eligible Beneficiaries in Prescription Drug Plans 9-10 (2007) (finding that the Department of Health and Human Services paid millions of dollars to fiscal intermediaries for drug coverage not actually provided to beneficiaries).
125. U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-06-710, Medicare Part D: Prescription Drug Plan Sponsor Call Center Responses Were Prompt, but Not Consistently Accurate and Complete 12-18 (2006) (finding that misinformation was provided to beneficiaries seeking help understanding complex program rules).
126. Repealing a major Bush Administration initiative would have been a major embarrassment to Republicans and would have increased the incremental cost of health care reform for Democrats.
127. See Thomas B. Edsall, Op-Ed., The Obamacare Crisis, N.Y. Times (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/20/opinion/edsall-the-obamacare-crisis.html.
128. This, along with funding for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that Republicans also despise, was the sole issue preventing Congress from agreeing to full-year appropriations bills for 2013. See Sarah Chacko & Emily Holden, With Little Ado, CR Sent to Obama's Desk, CQ Wkly. (Mar. 25, 2013), http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/ document.php?id=weeklyreport113-000004245454 (describing the Obama Administration's failure to obtain funding for the two agencies).
129. Accordingly, the ACA did not provide funding for HHS to operate thirty-six state exchanges. See Sarah Kliff, Does the Obama Administration Have the Money to Set Up Obamacare?, Wash. Post Wonkblog (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/04/12/does-the-obama-administration-have-the-money-to-set-upobamacare.
130. See Sarah Kliff, Budget Request Denied, Sebelius Turns to Health Executives to Finance Obamacare, Wash. Post Wonkblog (May 20, 2013), http://www.washington post.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/10/budget-request-denied-sebelius-turns-to-healthexecutives-to-finance-obamacare.
131. See David A. Super, Op-Ed., Bring On the Fiscal Cliff, N.Y. Times (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/18/opinion/forget-the-warnings-lets-drive-over-thefiscal-cliff.html (explaining the various fiscal deadlines and their consequences).
132. See David A. Super, Op-Ed., Bring On the Fiscal Cliff, N.Y. Times (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/18/opinion/forget-the-warnings-lets-drive-over-thefiscal-cliff.html (explaining the various fiscal deadlines and their consequences).
133. See David A. Super, Op-Ed., Bring On the Fiscal Cliff, N.Y. Times (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/18/opinion/forget-the-warnings-lets-drive-over-thefiscal-cliff.html (explaining the various fiscal deadlines and their consequences).
134. See David A. Super, Op-Ed., Bring On the Fiscal Cliff, N.Y. Times (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/18/opinion/forget-the-warnings-lets-drive-over-thefiscal-cliff.html (explaining the various fiscal deadlines and their consequences).
135. See David A. Super, Op-Ed., Bring On the Fiscal Cliff, N.Y. Times (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/18/opinion/forget-the-warnings-lets-drive-over-thefiscal-cliff.html (explaining the various fiscal deadlines and their consequences).
136. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
137. Ronald Brownstein, How to End the Obamacare Debate, Nat'l J. (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.nationaljournal.com/political-connections/how-to-end-the-obamacaredebate-20130919.
138. Marco Rubio Says Medicaid Expansion Money "Will Go Away, " PolitiFact. com (Jan. 12, 2014), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2014/jan/13/marcorubio/ marco-rubio-says-medicaid-expansion-money-will-go-.
139. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 5000A (2012).
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c) (2011).
141. See Julie Appleby, Governors Weigh Options on Health Insurance Exchanges, Kaiser Health News (Dec. 6. 2012), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2012/ december/07/governors-health-insurance-exchanges.aspx.
142. See, e.g., Richard Mauer, State Chamber of Commerce Bucks Parnell, Backs Medicaid Expansion, Anchorage Daily News (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.adn.com/ 2013/10/24/3139519/state-chamber-backs-medicaid-expansion.html.
143. Abby Goodnough & Robert Pear, Governors Fall Away in G.O.P. Opposition to More Medicaid, N.Y. Times (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/22/us/ politics/gop-governors-providing-a-lift-for-health-law.html.
144. Sandhya Somashekhar, In Several States, Medicaid Expansion Remains in Limbo as Time Runs Short, Wash. Post (May 2, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/in-several-statesmedicaid-expansion-remains-in-limbo-as-time-runs-short/2013/05/02/6dafcc02-b1b5-11e2-9a98-4be1688d7d84_story.html.
145. See Politics Wasn't Only Reason Why Some GOP-Led States Didn't Set Up Own Exchanges, NBC News (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/firstthoughts-six-things-watch-texas-tuesday-n43886.
146. Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, 2014, Kaiser Family Found., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expandingmedicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
147. Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, 2014, Kaiser Family Found., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expandingmedicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
148. Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, 2014, Kaiser Family Found., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expandingmedicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
149. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 1774 (1998).
150. See Amrita Jayakumar, Don't Expect 2014 to Be Much Better for Retail Sales, Trade Group Warns, Wash. Post (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ economy/dont-expect-2014-to-be-much-better-for-retail-sales-trade-group-warns/2014/02/ 06/09243656-8f6d-11e3-b46a-5a3d0d2130da_story.html.
151. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 1775-77 (1998).
152. See Richard H. Abbott, The Republican Party and the South, 1855-1877, at 230 (1986).
153. see also Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Creation of the Department of Justice: Professionalization Without Civil Rights or Civil Service, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 121, 141-42 (2014).
154. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
155. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
156. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 192 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
157. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 198 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
158. See Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement: Retirement Income and the Problem of Integration, 30 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1063, 1127 (1997).
159. Cf. David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2544, 2575-76 (2005).
160. See Craig Holman & Joan Claybrook, Outside Groups in the New Campaign Finance Environment: The Meaning of BCRA and the McConnell Decision, 22 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 235, 237 n.2 (2004).
161. Cf. David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2544, 2575-76 (2005).
162. Cf. David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2544, 2575-76 (2005).
163. Cf. David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2544, 2575-76 (2005).
164. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
165. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
166. Piotr Sztompka, The Trauma of Social Change: A Case of Postcommunist Societies, in Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity 155, 156 (Jeffrey C. Alexander et al. eds., 2004).
167. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 22-23, 137 (Talcott Parsons trans., Unwin Hyman 1930) (1905).
168. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)-(b) (2012) (excluding government grants and benefits, as well as many other public functions, from the APA's rulemaking procedures).
169. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)-(b) (2012) (excluding government grants and benefits, as well as many other public functions, from the APA's rulemaking procedures).
170. See Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1469 (2011).
171. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 311-13 (1968) (finding the "man in the house" rule, often used selectively to disqualify African Americans from Aid to Families with Dependent Children, was unauthorized by statute).
172. See Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 427 (The Free Press 1993) (1978).
173. See David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 585 (2008).
174. See Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 237-38, 323-40 (1982).
175. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733, 771, 774 (1964).
176. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 778, (1964).
177. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 § 11(b), 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2012).
178. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act § 2(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(1).
179. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2011).
180. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 101(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 654.
182. 42 U.S.C. § 654.
183. See David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 585 (2008).
184. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
185. Walter I. Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social Welfare in America 64-65, 207 (5th ed. 1994).
186. Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America 214-15 (1986).
187. Walter I. Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social Welfare in America 287, (5th ed. 1994).
188. Walter I. Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social Welfare in America 282, (5th ed. 1994).
189. Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America 215 (1986).
190. See David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 585 (2008).
191. See David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 585 (2008).
192. See David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 585 (2008).
193. See David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 585 (2008).
194. See David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 585 (2008).
195. see also U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-04-72, Overview of Federal Assistance to the New York City Area (2003).
196. See David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 585 (2008).
197. See Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., States of Depression, N.Y. Times (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/opinion/krugman-states-of-depression.html.
198. See I.R.C. § 164 (2012).
199. See David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 585 (2008).
200. See David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 585 (2008).
201. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382g(a)(3)-(4) (2011).
202. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2036 (2012).
203. See Chad Stone & Hannah Shaw, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, Emergency Unemployment Insurance Benefits Remain Critical for the Economy (2010), available at http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3320.
204. U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-10-4400, Unemployment Insurance Trust Funds: LongStanding State Financing Policies Have Increased Risk of Insolvency 6-7 (2010).
205. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619 (providing for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families block grants).
206. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619 (providing for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families block grants).
207. see also Liz Schott & LaDonna Pavetti, Redesigning the TANF Contingency Fund to Make It More Effective 1 (2011).
208. See, e.g., Isaac Shapiro & Jessica Goldberg, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, 1.1 Million "Exhaustees" Left out of Extension of Temporary Federal Unemployment Benefits (2002), available at http://www.cbpp.org/archiveSite/5-22-03ui.pdf (describing premature expiration of benefits after 2001 recession).
209. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o)(2)-(3).
210. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
211. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
212. See Judy Feder & John Holahan, Medicaid: Extending the Enhanced Federal Match Makes Sense (Guest Opinion), Kaiser Health News (June 30, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Columns/2011/June/063011federholahan.aspx.
213. See Dorothy Rosenbaum, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, SNAP Is Effective and Efficient 6 & n.9 (2013), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/7-23-10fa.pdf.
214. See Sam Dillon, Schools Aided by Stimulus Money Still Facing Cuts, N.Y. Times (Sept. 7, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/08/education/08school.html?pagewanted= all.
215. See, e.g., Brad Plumer, Food Stamps Will Get Cut by $5 Billion This Week-and More Cuts Could Follow, Wash. Post Wonkblog (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.washington post.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/28/food-stamps-will-get-cut-by-5-billion-this-weekand-more-cuts-could-follow.
216. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(1) (2011).
217. Indeed, states already had the ability to raise their effective income eligibility limits as high as they wished at existing matching rates by disregarding arbitrary amounts of income. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(r)(2). Their failure to do so indicated that they had gone as far as they were willing at current matching rates.
218. See Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 431, 472 & n. 205 (2011).
219. See Linda C. Fentiman, The New "Fetal Protection": The Wrong Answer to the Crisis of Inadequate Health Care for Women and Children, 84 Denv. U. L. Rev. 537, 595-96 (2006).
220. See Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, A Decade of SCHIP Experience and Issues for Reauthorization 3-4 (2007), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7574-2.pdf.
221. Cong. Budget Office, Federal Grants to State and Local Governments: Outlays in 2011 for Federal Grants to State and Local Governments 3 (2013).
222. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 Yale L.J. 1256, 1258-59 (2009).
223. See State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, 86 Stat. 919 (repealed 1981).
224. See 42 U.S.C. § 421 (2011).
225. See David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 585 (2008).
226. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602, 612 (1994) (repealed 1996).
227. 42 U.S.C. §§ 605-609 (2011). TANF also has a maintenance-of-effort funding requirement (MOE) for states, but, because it does not require that MOE funds be spent on the same activities as federal funds, it cannot be seen as a check on the integrity of state administration.
228. 7 C.F.R. pts. 271-285, 295 (2013).
229. 7 U.S.C. § 2025(c) (2012).
230. 7 U.S.C. § 2025(c) (2012).
231. 42 U.S.C. §§ 681-687 (1994) (repealed 1996).
232. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2015(d)(4), 2025(h) (2012).
233. Staff of H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 104th Cong., 1996 Green Book: Background Material and Data on Programs Within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means 413-19 (Comm. Print 1996).
234. Christopher Botsko et al., State Use of Funds to Increase Work Slots for Food Stamp Recipients: Report to Congress 23-31 (2001).
235. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(r)(2) (2011).
236. See John Holahan & Mary Beth Pohl, Leaders and Laggards in State Coverage Expansions, in Federalism & Health Policy 179, 181 (John Holahan et al. eds., 2003).
237. For example, with both parties seeking to be seen as requiring cash assistance recipients to work, the otherwise thinly drawn TANF regulations are spectacularly prescriptive about which kinds of work activities count. 45 C.F.R. §§ 261.30-.36 (2013).
238. See The Accuracy of CBO's Budget Projections, Cong. Budget Office (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.cbo.gov/publication/44017.
239. See Chapter 2: Origins and Effects of Federal Block Grant Programs, Nat'l Council on Disability, http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2013/05222013/05222013Ch2 (last visited Apr. 1, 2014) (documenting instances of Republicans' preference for capped programs).
240. It also significantly expands federal regulation of health plans previously subject to state insurance offices. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 18012 (limiting states' standard-setting authority over such plans). This is important public policy but does not meaningfully extend the New Deal's regulatory constitution.
241. Alec MacGillis et al., What It Means for Us All, in Landmark: The Inside Story of America's New Health-Care Law and What It Means for Us All, at 63, 68.
242. Carol S. Weissert, Promise and Perils of State-Based Road to Universal Health Insurance in the U.S., 7 J. Health Care L. & Pol'y 42, 47, 50-51 (2004).
243. Alec MacGillis et al., What It Means for Us All, in Landmark: The Inside Story of America's New Health-Care Law and What It Means for Us All, at 63, 68.
244. Alec MacGillis et al., What It Means for Us All, in Landmark: The Inside Story of America's New Health-Care Law and What It Means for Us All, at 63, 68.
245. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 18051(d) (allowing states to receive ninety-five percent of the federal funds otherwise coming to them for alternative health care systems).
246. Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, 2014, Kaiser Family Found., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expandingmedicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
247. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604-05 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
248. See Ezra Klein, 11 Facts About the Affordable Care Act, Wash. Post Wonkblog (June 24, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/06/24/11-factsabout-the-affordable-care-act.
249. See, e.g., Kaiser Health Tracking Poll, Feb, 2012, Roper Center, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cfide/psearch_test/webroot/multquestion_view.cfm?QST N_ID2=1806927&qid=+1806927&pid=4&ccid=4&x=75&y=12 (last visited Apr. 1, 2014) (finding that fifty-four percent of respondents believed the ACA increased the deficit).
250. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 18051-18052 (allowing states to design alternatives to insurance exchanges and premium subsidies).
251. Alex Wayne, Piling Trouble on a Torn Net, CQ Wkly. (Sept. 21, 2009), http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreport111-000003206255 (proposing to abolish state eligibility rules).
252. See, e.g., Peter Beilenson & Ken Ulman, Let the States Lead: National Health Care Reform Is Gridlocked-in Part Because We Don't Know What Works, Balt. Sun (Jan. 31, 2010), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-01-31/news/bal-op.health31_1_nationalhealth-care-reform-health-status-hospital-and-emergency-room.
253. See Editorial, The Next Step on Health Reform, N.Y. Times (Dec. 26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/27/opinion/27sun1.html?pagewanted=all (describing the House's efforts to establish insurance exchanges at the federal level, which the Senate ultimately rejected).
254. See Editorial, The Next Step on Health Reform, N.Y. Times (Dec. 26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/27/opinion/27sun1.html?pagewanted=all (describing the House's efforts to establish insurance exchanges at the federal level, which the Senate ultimately rejected).
255. See Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, Medicaid Financing: An Overview of the Federal Medicaid Matching Rate (FMAP) 1 (2012), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8352.pdf.
256. See Establishing Health Insurance Marketplaces: An Overview of State Efforts, Kaiser Family Found. (May 2, 2013), http://kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/establishinghealth-insurance-exchanges-an-overview-of (reporting that twenty-six states are declining to run insurance exchanges).
257. See, e.g., State Action to Establish Health Insurance Marketplaces: Idaho, Commonwealth Fund (July 2013), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Maps-and-Data/State-Exchange-Map.aspx#Idaho (describing a nongovernmental exchange with a board dominated by health care providers and insurance companies).
258. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
259. The Federalist No. 40, at 254-55 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
260. The Federalist No. 40, at 254-55 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
261. Walter I. Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social Welfare in America 230, (5th ed. 1994).
262. See James T. Patterson, America's Struggle Against Poverty: 1900-1985, at 31 (1986).
263. Walter I. Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social Welfare in America 32-46, (5th ed. 1994).
264. Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America 58-66 (1986).
265. Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America 186-90 (1986).
266. Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America 36-57 (1986).
267. Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America 23-24 (1986).
268. See Frances Fox Piven & Richard A. Cloward, Regulating The Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare 33-38, 165-75 (1971).
269. Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America 85 (1986).
270. Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America 54-55 (1986).
271. Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America 58-60 (1986).
272. See Kerry R. Bensinger, From Public Charity to Social Justice: The Role of the Court in California's General Relief Program, 21 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 497, 505-08 (1988).
273. Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America 226 (1986).
274. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
275. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
276. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
277. Opponents recently have sought to deflect proposals like the ACA with tax-preferred medical savings accounts. See, e.g., Steve Huntley, Op-Ed., No Winners in Obama's Health-Care Overhaul, Chi. Sun-Times, Feb. 23, 2010, at 18.
278. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
279. see Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980, at 229-30 (1984) (advocating elimination of all public welfare programs operating above the local level).
280. Marvin Olasky, The Tragedy of American Compassion 24-31 (1992) (praising efforts to bring "countryside" values of personal connection and mutual responsibility to the alienating city).
281. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
282. See Cong. Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2013 to 2023, at 16 tbl.1-3 (2013) (showing that spending on Social Security, Medicare, and UI was seventy percent of mandatory spending in 2012).
283. See Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States 229-30 (1985) (describing the programs that facilitated the white middle class's move to the suburbs after World War II).
284. Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America 214-15 (1986).
285. Martin Carnoy & Derek Shearer, Economic Democracy: The Challenge of the 1980s 339-50 (1980).
286. See Where Are States Today? Medicaid and CHIP Eligibility Levels for Children and Non-Disabled Adults as of January 1, 2014, Kaiser Family Found. (Jan. 13, 2014), http://kff.org/medicaid/fact-sheet/where-are-states-today-medicaid-and-chip.
287. Cf. Beverly Leopold McDonald & Rita Diehl, Women and Welfare, 14 Clearinghouse Rev. 1036, 1038 (1981) (explaining that women obtain through social insurance programs what most men obtain through employment).
288. Cf. Beverly Leopold McDonald & Rita Diehl, Women and Welfare, 14 Clearinghouse Rev. 1036, 1038 (1981) (explaining that women obtain through social insurance programs what most men obtain through employment).
289. See, e.g., Maurice Emsellem et al., Income Supports Can Dramatically Increase Resources Available for Lower-Income Working Families, 34 Clearinghouse Rev. 509, 520-25 (2001).
290. Michelle Mitchell, Note, Gender and Unemployment Insurance: Why Women Receive Unemployment Benefits at Lower Rates than Men and Will Unemployment Insurance Reform Close the Gender Gap?, 20 Tex. J. Women & L. 55, 64-68 (2010).
291. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(V) (2011).
292. See Dorothy K. Newman et al., Protest, Politics, and Prosperity: Black Americans and White Institutions, 1940-75, at 76-77 (1978).
293. See, e.g., Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 554, 559-60 (1970) (striking down state practices that financially disqualify children whose mothers cohabit with men).
294. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333-34 (1968) (denying states' authority to add new conditions of moral eligibility).
295. See James T. Patterson, America's Struggle Against Poverty: 1900-1985, at 31 (1986).
296. See Frances Fox Piven & Richard A. Cloward, Regulating The Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare 33-38, 165-75 (1971).
297. See Lawrence M. Mead, The New Politics of Poverty: The Nonworking Poor in America 28-33 (1992).
298. Although eligibility for long-term care assistance is nominally subject to the Medicaid means test, Congress in the 1980s modified that test for middle-income nursing home patients to allow them to qualify. Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 303, 102 Stat. 683, 754-64 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5).
299. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
300. See Danilo Trisi & LaDonna Pavetti, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, TANF Weakening as a Safety Net for Poor Families 1 (2012), available at http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=3700.
301. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 767-68 (1975) (rejecting challenge to irrebuttable presumption that marriages occurring shortly before death were shams not entitling the surviving spouse to Social Security on the decedent's account).
302. One former senior HHS official sadly described its two large health care programs to the author as "Med-I-Care and Med-I-Don't-Care. " David A. Super, Op-Ed., An Error Message for the Poor, N.Y. Times (Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/04/ opinion/an-error-message-for-the-poor.html.
303. See David A. Super, Are Rights Efficient? Challenging the Managerial Critique of Individual Rights, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 1051, 1103-04 (2005).
304. See, e.g., Alexander v. Polk, 750 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1984) (scrutinizing procedures for allocating scarce slots in the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children).
305. See David A. Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 633, 672-77 (2004).
306. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174, 177 (1941).
307. See David A. Super, A New New Property, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1773, 1773 (2013).
308. See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1121, 1137 (2000).
309. See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1138 (2000).
310. See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1138 (2000).
311. See Peter Edelman, Searching for America's Heart: RFK and the Renewal of Hope 108-12 (2001).
312. See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1121, 1137 (2000).
313. See David A. Super, The New Moralizers: Transforming the Conservative Legal Agenda, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2032, 2060-61 (2004).
314. David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the Personal Choice Model for Rationing Public Benefits, 113 Yale L.J. 815, 838-39 (2004).
315. See, e.g., Medora v. Colautti, 602 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1979) (analyzing the requirement that applicants for general assistance first exhaust other possible public benefit programs).
316. Act of Mar. 29, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 204, 89 Stat. 26, 30-32 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 32 (2012).
317. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 111, 100 Stat. 2085, 2107-08 (amending I.R.C. § 32).
318. See Cong. Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2013 to 2023, at 16 tbl.1-3 (2013) (showing that spending on Social Security, Medicare, and UI was seventy percent of mandatory spending in 2012).
319. See Jobs with Social Security, Social Security, http://www.ssa.gov/ny/jobsgeneral. htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
320. David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 Calif. L. Rev. 393, 444 n.206 (2008).
321. See Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine 374-75 (1982).
322. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(2) (1994) (amended 1996) (requiring in-person interviews each time a household's application to receive food stamps is approved or renewed).
323. 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(e)(1) (2013) (requiring interviews prior to approval to receive SNAP benefits and at least annually thereafter).
324. 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(d).
325. 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(d).
326. 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(d).
327. 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(d).
328. 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(d).
329. See Donna Cohen Ross & Laura Cox, Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, Making It Simple: Medicaid for Children and CHIP Income Eligibility Guidelines and Enrollment Procedures, at ii (2000), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2000/09/2166.pdf.
330. See Donna Cohen Ross & Laura Cox, Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, Making It Simple: Medicaid for Children and CHIP Income Eligibility Guidelines and Enrollment Procedures, at 15 (2000), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2000/09/2166.pdf.
331. See Matea Gold et al., Indiana's Bumpy Road to Privatization, L.A. Times (June 24, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/24/nation/la-na-indiana-privatize-20110624.
332. Judith Havemann, Welfare Reform Incorporated: Social Policy Going Private, Wash. Post (Mar. 7, 1997), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/welfare/stories/ wf030797.htm.
333. See David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 1375, 1423-28 (2011) (analyzing the psychological roots of our collective attachment to administrative discretion).
334. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
335. Alec MacGillis et al., What It Means for Us All, in Landmark: The Inside Story of America's New Health-Care Law and What It Means for Us All, at 63, 68.
336. Alec MacGillis et al., What It Means for Us All, in Landmark: The Inside Story of America's New Health-Care Law and What It Means for Us All, at 63, 68.
337. See Neil S. Siegel, Free Riding on Benevolence: Collective Action and the Minimum Coverage Provision, 75 Law & Contemp. Probs. 29, 62-63 (2012).
338. Eugene Robinson, Op-Ed., Behind the Rage, a Cold Reality, Wash. Post (Aug. 11, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/10/AR20090810 02455.html.
339. See David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 1375, 1423-28 (2011) (analyzing the psychological roots of our collective attachment to administrative discretion).
340. See Jacob Sullum, Idea of "Right" to Health Care Is Wrong, Chi. Sun-Times, Dec. 24, 2009, at 14.
341. See Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 533, 579-84 (1995) (describing mismatch between families' need and annual measures of income).
342. See Lily L. Batchelder, Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging Reconsidered, 40 Harv. J. on Legis. 395, 396 (2003) (finding that poor people pay more taxes than their average incomes would dictate because of the tax code's treatment of their fluctuating income).
343. See Judith Solomon & Robert Greenstein, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, Provision in House Republican Payroll Tax Bill Would Cause 170,000 People to Forgo Health Coverage and Could Jeopardize Health Reform (2011), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/12-12-11health2.pdf.
344. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Susanne Craig, Only 106,000 Pick Health Insurance Plans in First Month, N.Y. Times (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/ 14/us/health-law-enrollment-figures-far-lower-than-initial-estimates.html (describing the system's highly automated, deindividualized structure).
345. See, e.g., Jeffery H. Birnbaum & Alan S. Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform 6 (1987) (quoting William Jennings Bryan as calling taxation "a badge of freedom").
346. Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes 20-22 (1999) (finding that effective taxation is a precondition to the effectiveness of any individual rights).
347. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XVI.
348. U.S. Const. amend. XVI.
349. See James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy 77 (1962).
350. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
351. W. Elliot Brownlee, Wilson and Financing the Modern State: The Revenue Act of 1916, 129 Proc. Am. Phil. Soc'y 173, 175 (1985).
352. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 3-5 (2010) (providing a roadmap to this kind of popular constitutionalism).
353. Affluent recipients of capital income have proven adept at evading even taxes designed to reach them. Henry J. Aaron, Richer Means Harder to Tax, in Tax Policy in the Twenty-First Century 232, 240-43 (Herbert Stein ed., 1988).
354. Joel Slemrod, Professional Opinions About Tax Policy: 1994 and 1934, in Tax Policy in the Real World 435, 435, 448 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1999).
355. Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 150, 150 (1995).
356. James M. Buchanan, The Economics of Earmarked Taxes, 71 J. Pol. Econ. 457, 465-67 (1963).
357. See Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures 91 (1985).
358. See Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures 97-98 (1985).
359. Randall G. Holcombe, Tax Policy from a Public Choice Perspective, in Tax Policy in the Real World, at 397, 401.
360. See Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures 31 (1985).
361. E.g., Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation: The Definition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal Policy 108-09 (1938).
362. See, e.g., Jeffery H. Birnbaum & Alan S. Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform 6 (1987) (quoting William Jennings Bryan as calling taxation "a badge of freedom").
363. See, e.g., Jeffery H. Birnbaum & Alan S. Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform 6 (1987) (quoting William Jennings Bryan as calling taxation "a badge of freedom").
364. See Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures 106-07 (1985).
365. See Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures 106-07 (1985).
366. See Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures 106-07 (1985).
367. See Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures 106-07 (1985).
368. See Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures 106-07 (1985).
369. Another bipartisan agreement earlier in President Reagan's Administration buttressed the New Deal constitution's preference for earmarking by solving an impending shortage in Social Security funding entirely within the trust fund structure. Michael B. Katz, The Price of Citizenship: Redefining the American Welfare State 239-40 (updated ed. 2008).
370. See 1 U.S. Treasury Dep't, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth, at ii (1984), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/ Documents/tres84v1All.pdf.
371. See, e.g., Jeffery H. Birnbaum & Alan S. Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform 6 (1987) (quoting William Jennings Bryan as calling taxation "a badge of freedom").
372. See, e.g., Jeffery H. Birnbaum & Alan S. Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform 6 (1987) (quoting William Jennings Bryan as calling taxation "a badge of freedom").
373. See, e.g., Jeffery H. Birnbaum & Alan S. Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform 6 (1987) (quoting William Jennings Bryan as calling taxation "a badge of freedom").
374. See, e.g., Jeffery H. Birnbaum & Alan S. Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform 6 (1987) (quoting William Jennings Bryan as calling taxation "a badge of freedom").
375. See, e.g., Jeffery H. Birnbaum & Alan S. Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform 6 (1987) (quoting William Jennings Bryan as calling taxation "a badge of freedom").
376. See, e.g., Jeffery H. Birnbaum & Alan S. Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform 6 (1987) (quoting William Jennings Bryan as calling taxation "a badge of freedom").
377. See, e.g., Jeffery H. Birnbaum & Alan S. Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform 6 (1987) (quoting William Jennings Bryan as calling taxation "a badge of freedom").
378. See, e.g., Jeffery H. Birnbaum & Alan S. Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform 6 (1987) (quoting William Jennings Bryan as calling taxation "a badge of freedom").
379. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 Yale L.J. 1165, 1181-82 (1993) (referencing some of these controversies).
380. See, e.g., Jeffery H. Birnbaum & Alan S. Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform 6 (1987) (quoting William Jennings Bryan as calling taxation "a badge of freedom").
381. See Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well?: Congress and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 891, 893 (1987).
382. See, e.g., Daniel S. Goldberg, Tax Subsidies: One-Time vs. Periodic: An Economic Analysis of the Tax Policy Alternatives, 49 Tax L. Rev. 305, 305-07 (1994) (finding evidence that the Tax Reform Act's simplification was rapidly being reversed).
383. Eduardo Porter, A Nation of Too Many Tax Breaks, N.Y. Times (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 2012/03/14/business/a-nation-with-too-many-tax-breaks-economic-scene.html (noting that tax expenditures climbed from 6% of gross domestic product in 1988 to 7.8% in 2003, reversing two-thirds of the Tax Reform Act's simplifications).
384. See Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures 106-07 (1985).
385. Nat'l Comm'n on Fiscal Responsibility & Reform, The Moment of Truth 15, 28-34 (2010), available at http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/ files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf. Although endorsed by co-chairs Alan Simpson and Erskine Bowles, the proposal received insufficient support to become a recommendation of the commission itself. The proposal also did not specify how the tax code could be rewritten in this manner.
386. I.R.C. § 5000A(c) (2012).
387. See Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 23, 24 (2006) (criticizing regressivity of deductions as a means of tax expenditure).
388. See Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures 71 (1985).
389. See Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures 71 (1985).
390. See Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures 71 (1985).
391. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
392. I.R.C. § 4980I (2012).
393. I.R.C. § 4980I (2012).
394. See Richard Rubin, Doling Out Health Subsidies Could Further Tax IRS, CQ Wkly. (Oct. 19, 2009), http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreport111-000003 225319.
395. See Romney: Individual Mandate "Is a Tax, " CBS News (July 4, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/romney-individual-mandate-is-a-tax.
396. Courtney Collins & Andrew J. Rettenmaier, Nat'l Ctr. for Policy Analysis, How Health Reform Affects Current and Future Retirees (2011), available at http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/st333.pdf. This principle is exceedingly difficult to administer in practice, particularly because the earmarking is largely a political fiction. No serious observer believes that the exhaustion of dedicated funds would constitute a politically viable excuse for Congress to allow Social Security or Medicare hospitalization benefits to cease. Therefore, the Medicare cuts in the ACA effectively reduced the amount of general funds going into Medicare, arguably reinforcing the principle of earmarking.
397. See R. Glenn Hubbard, On the Use of "Distributional Tables" in the Tax Policy Process, in Tax Policy in the Real World, at 293, 296-98 (discussing the difficulty of producing such tables).
398. See Stanley L. Winer & Walter Hettich, What Is Missed if We Leave Out Collective Choice in the Analysis of Taxation, in Tax Policy in the Real World, at 411, 415-16 (finding that many tax expenditures represent political equilibria that ordinarily make them hard to liquidate).
399. This delay may be a relatively short one as Republicans have again made the reduction in tax rates a major part of their agenda, which they assert should be offset with reductions in tax preferences. See Matt Bai, Obama v. Boehner: Who Killed the Debt Deal?, N.Y. Times Mag. (Mar. 28, 2012) http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/01/magazine/obama-vsboehner-who-killed-the-debt-deal.html.
400. Lori Montgomery, Rep. Dave Camp Patiently Pursues Tax Reform, Wash. Post (July 28, 2012) http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-07-28/business/35487579_1_taxcode-tax-system-popular-deductions.
401. see also David Brody, Paul Ryan Exclusive: Explains Why Romney Campaign Won't Reveal Tax Loopholes, Brody File (Sept. 16, 2012, 11:34 PM), http://blogs.cbn.com/thebrodyfile/archive/2012/09/16/paul-ryan-exclusive-explains-why-romney-campaign-wont-reveal-tax.aspx (invoking the 1986 Act as a guide).
402. Mitt Romney: Rich Taxpayers Will Pay Their Share, CNN Money (Aug. 15, 2012, 5:00 AM ET), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/08/15/mitt-romney-interview.
403. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
404. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
405. see Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down requirement that entire industry conform to terms of union contracts negotiated by mines with two-thirds of industry production).
406. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 297 (1998).
407. Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly: A Study in Economic Ambivalence 223-24 (1966) (reporting President Roosevelt's instruction to abandon legislation that would test Carter Coal).
408. See Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72, 90 (3d Cir. 1984) (Becker, J., dissenting) (arguing against reliance on industry accreditation in the distribution of federal funds).
409. Other frontiers may open in coming years but are insufficiently developed today to figure directly in a constitutional moment. See generally Jon D. Michaels, Privatization's Progeny, 101 Geo. L.J. 1023, 1060-88 (2013) (exploring various early privatization initiatives).
410. See, e.g., John D. Donahue & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Collaborative Governance: Private Roles for Public Goals in Turbulent Times 3-11 (2011).
411. John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State 331 (1967).
412. See, e.g., Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority 85-93 (1969) (describing the process by which industry groups come to dominate the agencies established to regulate them).
413. See David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 1375, 1423-28 (2011) (analyzing the psychological roots of our collective attachment to administrative discretion).
414. Walter I. Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social Welfare in America 326, (5th ed. 1994).
415. Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America 129-33 (1986).
416. Michael S. Sparer, Safety Net Providers and the New Medicaid: Choices and Challenges, in Medicaid and Devolution: A View from the States 154, 156-66 (Frank J. Thompson & John J. DiIulio Jr. eds., 1998).
417. See David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 1375, 1423-28 (2011) (analyzing the psychological roots of our collective attachment to administrative discretion).
418. See David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 1375, 1423-28 (2011) (analyzing the psychological roots of our collective attachment to administrative discretion).
419. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-111 (2011).
420. See, e.g., John D. Donahue, The Race: Can Collaboration Outrun Rivalry Between American Business and Government?, 70 Pub. Admin. Rev. (Special Issue) S151, S151-52 (2010).
421. See Henry J. Aaron & Robert D. Reischauer, Countdown to Reform: The Great Social Security Debate 77 (rev. ed. 2001).
422. Jon Michaels, All the President's Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 Calif. L. Rev. 901, 904, 913, 926-27 (2008).
423. See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Reconsidering the Nondelegation Doctrine: Universal Service, the Power to Tax, and the Ratification Doctrine, 80 Ind. L.J. 239 (2005) (discussing redistribution through regulatory taxes).
424. See, e.g., David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 389, 451-60 (2011) (tracing the economic incidence of redistribution via private law rules).
425. See Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1229, 1260 (2003).
426. See, e.g., David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 451-60 (2011) (tracing the economic incidence of redistribution via private law rules).
427. See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization's Pretensions, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 717, 719-24 (2010) (arguing that privatization systematically expands executive power at the expense of the other branches).
428. Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty: Why Privatization of Government Functions Threatens Democracy and What We Can Do About It 1-7, 78-80 (2007).
429. Avihay Dorfman & Alon Harel, The Case Against Privatization, 41 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 67, 68 (2013).
430. John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State 331 (1967).
431. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 770, (1964).
432. Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets 8-14 (2012).
433. See Charles Noble, Welfare as We Knew It: A Political History of the American Welfare State 140-41 (1997).
434. See, e.g., David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 453-61 (2011) (tracing the economic incidence of redistribution via private law rules).
435. Alec MacGillis et al., What It Means for Us All, in Landmark: The Inside Story of America's New Health-Care Law and What It Means for Us All, at 63, 68.
436. See I.R.C. § 163(h) (2012).
437. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2595-96 (2012).
438. Alec MacGillis et al., What It Means for Us All, in Landmark: The Inside Story of America's New Health-Care Law and What It Means for Us All, at 63, 68.
439. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(h) (2011).
440. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Mooching Off Medicaid, N.Y. Times (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/04/opinion/krugman-mooching-off-medicare.html (criticizing proposal as a wasteful giveaway to health insurer interests).
441. Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., to Justin Senior, Deputy Sec'y of Medicaid, Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin. (Feb. 20, 2013) (on file with author) (indicating willingness to approve such a waiver).
442. 42 U.S.C. § 18083(d)(2)(B).
443. 42 U.S.C. § 18083(d)(2)(B).
444. See Health Care Reform, AFSCME (2009), http://www.afscme.org/members/ conventions/resolutions-and-amendments/ieb-resolutions/health-care-reform (threatening to oppose the Senate bill that became the foundation of the ACA).
445. Cf. Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1367, 1487-92 (2003) (analyzing constitutional implications of eligibility determinations).
446. See, e.g., Lisa Dubay et al., Advancing Toward Universal Coverage: Are States Able to Take the Lead?, 7 J. Health Care L. & Pol'y 1, 8 (2004) (discussing single-payer strategies).
447. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
448. See, e.g., David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 461 (2011) (tracing the economic incidence of redistribution via private law rules).
449. But cf. Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political Advocacy, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1197, 1197 (2008) (finding privatization's effect on industry lobbying effort ambiguous).
450. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 7-10 (1998).
451. A. Barton Hinkle, Big-Government Ratchet Turns Another Click, Reason (Aug. 22, 2012), http://reason.com/archives/2012/08/22/big-government-ratchet-turns-another-cli.
452. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2647 (2012) (joint dissent).
453. Privatization also often represents efforts by one executive to bind successors, and the legislature, to particular policy choices. Jon D. Michaels, The (Willingly) Fettered Executive: Presidential Spinoffs in National Security Domains and Beyond, 97 Va. L. Rev. 801, 845-55 (2011).
454. See J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 208-09 (2d ed. 1979).
455. Edward S. Morgan & Helen M. Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution 353-70 (1962).
456. Denise Grady et al., Scant Oversight of Drug Maker in Fatal Meningitis Outbreak, N.Y. Times (Oct. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/us/scant-drug-makeroversight-in-meningitis-outbreak.html.
457. See David A. Super, Protecting Civil Rights in the Shadows, 123 Yale L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (discussing political difficulties of low-income people during periods of low salience).
458. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 774, (1964).
459. See, e.g., Matthew Continetti, Hands Off My Medicare, Wkly. Standard (Aug. 17, 2009, 2:39 PM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2009/08/hands_off_ my_medicare_1.asp (defending the ACA's critics who approve of Medicare).