What do we know about the impact of government interventions in the banking sector? An assessment of various bailout programs on bank behavior

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volumn 46, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 246-265

  Hryckiewicz, Aneta ^a  

^a KOZMINSKI UNIVERSITY   (Poland)

Author keywords

Bailout; Crisis; Financial stability; Government interventions; Moral hazard

Indexed keywords

EID: 84946169012     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.05.009     Document Type: Article

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